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I.  The  purpose  of this  report  is  twofold:  to 
describe  the  measures  the  Community  should 
take in  the years ahead in  order to establish the 
tax  conditions  necessary  for  a  genuine  eco-
nomic integration; and to identify the obstacles 
hampering  achievement  of this  objective  and 
the way~ and means of overcoming them. 
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Chapter/ 
Tax harmonization: Objectives and 
limits 
2.  In  all  developed  countries,  taxation  has, 
over  many  years,  come  to  play  a  rapidly  ex-
panding  role  as  a  result  of  growing  public 
budgets  and its  own  increasing importance as 
an  instrument  of economic and social  policy. 
For this reason, taxes, which account for a large 
proportion of gross domestic product,  1 have be-
come one of the key determinants of economic 
and social activity. 
3.  It is  only  natural,  therefore,  that  taxation 
should be a focus of attention in  the Commu-
nity.  However, there can be  no question at the 
moment of framing a genuine tax policy similar 
to  that applied by  the  Member States.  In  the 
first  place, although it  is  now  financed out of 
own  resources,2  the Community Budget is  still 
very  modest when compared with the  Member 
States'  budgets taken together (2.6 o/o  in  1978), 
with  the  result  that  taxation  can  play  only  a 
very  limited  budgetary  role  at  Community 
level.  Secondly, economic and social  policy  is 
still  very  much  a  matter  for  national  govern-
ments, and for this reason the use of taxation as 
an  instrument  of this  policy  cannot be inade 
subject to Community rules. Lastly, even where 
economic  policy  objectives  such  as  contain-
ment of inflation rates and the programming of 
economic growth are fixed at Community level, 
the actual measures to be taken, including those 
in the tax field, are generally left to the discre-
tion of the Member States. 
1  In  1977.  tax  receipts and social contributions in  the Mem-
ber States as a proportion of GOP ranged from 35.2 o/o  in Ire-
land to 49.4 o/o  in  Luxembourg. 
'  Own  resources are made up essentially of customs duties, 
agricultural levies and a  portion (not  more than  I o/o)of  the 
uniform basis of as,sessment  for VAT. 
5 And so, in  the tax field,  fundamental decisions 
are  the  prerogative of the  Member  States and 
extensive  transfers  of decisionmaking  powers 
will  not be feasible unless substantial progress is 
made  towards  integration.  Tax  harmonization 
is  not intended, therefore, to serve the purpose 
of instituting a Community tax policy, nor is  it 
an end in itself. It forms  part of the means and 
powers granted to the Community to carry out 
its responsibilities. 
4.  The  EEC  Treaty  lays  down  a  number of 
fundamental objectives, including: 
(i)  the  establishment of a  common  market  by 
way of, among other things, the free movement 
of persons,  goods,  services  and  capital  and a 
system that ensures that competition is  not dis-
torted; 
(ii)  the  progressive  alignment  of  Member 
States' economic policies; 
(iii)  the  institution  of a  number  of common 
policies:  the  EEC  Treaty  provides  for  only 
three  such  policies  (external  trade, agriculture 
and transport), but other common policies have 
been  decided  on,  in  principle  at  least,  by  the 
Community institutions, notably for energy, re-
gional policy and the environment. 
In  addition,  it  was  decided  as  early  as  1970 
that, under the procedure provided for in  Arti-
cle 20 I of the Treaty, the Member States' finan-
cial  contributions  would  be  replaced  by  the 
Community's own resources in order to give the 
Community greater financial independence.1 
The tax  harmonization measures  already or to 
be introduced by the Community must be seen 
in  the  light  of these  objectives,  for,  as  this 
Chapter shows, none of them can be achieved 
without Community action in the field of taxa-
tion. 
All  these  objectives  have  been restated  in  the 
context  of the  economic and  monetary  union 
decided on  by  the  Heads of State or Govern-
ment.  With  regard to tax  matters,  the  Council 
Resolution of22 March 197)2 reads as follows: 
'In order that effectively  free  movement of persons, 
goods, services and capital and progress in interpene-
tration of economies may be achieved at a faster rate, 
the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commis-
6 
sian and having regard to the need to preserve a bal-
ance, shall decide on measures concerning: 
(i)  Community  rules  determining  the  uniform  basis 
for assessing the value added tax within the meaning 
of the  Decision of 21  April  1970  on the replacement 
of financial contributions from the Member States by 
the Communities' own resources; 
(ii)  the  harmonization of the scope, basis of assess-
ment and the mode of levying excise duties, in parti-
cular those  which  have an  appreciable  influence on 
trade; 
(iii)  the  harmonization  of those  kinds  of tax  which 
are likely to have a direct influence on capital move-
ments within the Community, in  particular the taxa-
tion of interest from  fixed-interest securities and div-
idends: 
(iv)  the further harmonization of the taxation of com-
panies and firms; 
(v)  the progressive extension of duty-free concessions 
granted  to  private  individuals  crossing  frontiers 
within the Community. 
Before the end of the first stage the Council shall ex· 
a?:Jine the results of research on the alignment of rates 
of value  added  tax  and  excise  duties  and  the  pro-
posals of the Commission in this field.' 
Although the path towards economic and mon-
etary  union  has  by  no  means  been  smooth 
since  that  first  Council  Resolution  was 
adopted,  the  objective  has  never  been  aban-
doned. Indeed, a renewed drive is  now evident 
- with  the  recent  establishment of the  Euro-
pean Monetary System.3 
5.  Bringing  Member States'  tax  systems  into 
closer alignment is not a straightforward matter 
for a number of reasons: 
(a)  Tax sovereignty is  one of the  fundamental 
components  of  national  sovereignty,  and  at 
present all the Member States set great store by 
the  inviolability  of national  sovereignty.  It is 
important  here  to  remember  that  one  of the 
fundamental  prerogatives  of  national  parlia-
ments is the right to vote taxes; 
J  Decision of 21  April 1970: OJ L 94 of 28. 4.  1970. 
'  OJ C 28 of 27.  3.  1971. 
3  Bull.  EC 12-1978.  points 1.1.1  et seq.; Twelfth General Re-
port. point 96. 
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progressive  approximation  of Member  States' 
economic policies  provided for  in  Article 2 of 
the EEC Treaty and the harmonization of their 
tax systems - may come into conflict. This  is 
because  Member States may  need to manipu-
late differently the instruments at their disposal 
for implementing national economic policies in 
order  to  remedy .the  divergences  existing  be-
tween  those  policies.  The  instrument  of tax-
ation is  in this respect very important, not least 
because  it  determines  to  a  very  large  degree 
public  expenditure  policy  and investment  in-
centives; in any case, its importance is  unlikely 
to  decline  since,  in  the  European  Monetary 
System,  the  Member States  are  unable to  use 
the monetary instrument as freely as before; 
(c)  The general public Is  becoming increa~ingly 
sensitive  to  taxation;  people  think  taxes  are 
both too high and too complicated. 
(d)  It is  extremely  difficult to remove dispari-
ties in the structure of the tax system, the over-
all burden of taxation and the allocation of re-
venue  between  the  different  taxes,  since  they 
are  not fortuitous  but are  a  function  of deep-
rooted causes. 
These causes include: 
(i)  differences  in  economic  and  social  struc-
tures; 
(ii)  different conceptions of the role of taxation 
in  general  or of one tax  in  particular:  for  in-
stance,  views  differ  on  the  volume  of invest-
ment that the State should finance  and on the 
range of services it should supply as a  quid pro 
quo for taxes paid, on the degree of income and 
wealth redistribution to be aimed at and on the 
way  in  which  taxation  should  be  used  as  an 
economic policy instrument; 
(iii)  differences  in  acceptability:  a  tax  that  is 
fairly well  tolerated in one country is  accepted 
grudgingly or not at all in another country; 
(e)  The  complexity  of  present  tax  systems 
means  that  tax  harmonization  is  faced  with 
technical difficulties. 
Lastly, there can be  no hiding the fact that fur-
ther enlargement of the Community to bring it 
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up to twelve Member States, far from  simplify-
ing the task, will complicate it even more. 
6.  All  these considerations explain the hesita-
tions by the Member States and the slowness of 
tax harmonization. 
In  spite of these daunting difficulties, tax har-
monization has in fact scored some undoubted 
successes, and this can be put down to the com-
bination of several factors. 
Firstly, agreement was reached on a number of 
priority objectives  (free  movement of persons, 
goods, services  and capital; neutrality of taxa-
tion in respect of merchandise trade; institution 
of a  system  ensuring  that  competition  is  not 
distorted; abolition of tax frontiers; creation of 
the Community's own resources) and there has 
emerged a  genuine political resolve to  achieve 
some of them, at least in part. 
Secondly, there has been no need for any steps 
affecting the personal taxes paid by individuals 
(income tax and wealth tax), which are the most 
politically sensitive ones. 
Lastly, virtually all the !J1easures so far adopted 
or  merely  proposed  (concerned  for  the  most 
part with turnover taxes, excise duties, indirect 
taxes on the raising of capital and corporation 
tax)  are  for  the  time  being confined to  struc-
tures and bases of assessment. As  long as  they 
are  at  liberty  to  determine  tax  rates,  Member 
States can avoid jeopardizing the  balance that 
has  been  forged  between  the  different  taxes,· 
while at the same time remaining free to use the 
taxes  to  be  harmonized for  budgetary or  eco-
nomic purposes. As  a  result, it  has been. poss-
ible to avoid conflict between tax harmonization 
and Member States' freedom to determine the 
budgetary and economic function of taxation. 
7.  Although, the record  in  tax  harmonization 
is  certainly  positive,  the  successes  have  been 
limited, because of the difficulties and long de-
lays that have  piled up at Council level  as  re-
gards  excise  duties  and  direct  taxes.  For  in-
stance, in  spite of the Commission's efforts, the 
Council has not as  yet been able to act on the 
long~standing proposals concerning the  excise 
7 duties  on wine,  beer,  spirits  and mineral  oils, 
which,  however,  deal  only with  tax  structures 
and not tax rates. 
Even  more  serious  difficulties  are  therefore  to 
be expected once the approximation of tax leg-
islation is extended to tax rates. For this reason, 
such  approximation  will  be, possible only at a 
much  more  advanced stage  of economic inte-
gration. Then, however, it will be absolutely nec-
essary,  since  the  harmonization  of structures 
and bases of assessment will  no longer be suffi-
cient. 
Admittedly, the  present uncertainty as  to how 
far the economic integration of the Community 
should go and how  fast  progress can be made 
makes  it  extremely  difficult  to  determine  ex-
actly what tax measures will be needed; and of 
course, it is even more difficult to draw up a de-
tailed timetable for such measures. In the final 
analysis, everything will depend on the division 
of powers between the  Member States and the 
Community and hence on the transfers of sov-
ereignty to  the Community. Discussion of this 
matter has  hardly advanced beyond the initial 
stage. 
In spite of this uncertainty, a number of points 
are  worth  considering.  Economic  integration 
implies a  'single market', that is  to say a  com-
mon market with characteristics similar to those 
of a domestic market, and at once we  have the 
problems of abolishing tax frontiers (i.e. border 
adjustments  and  cheeks  in  respect  of  intra-
Community trade) and of harmonizing tax bur-
dens. 
As  we  have said, taxation is  one of the major 
determinants of a  country's economic and so-
cial  life.  The  level  of taxes  influences a  wide 
range of factors, including the structure of con-
sumption  and  hence  of production,  company 
profitability, the location of investment projects 
and, generally speaking, the conditions of com-
petition. 
With the prospect before us of a thrust for eco-
nomic  integration,  these  various  factors  must 
8 
not be  artifically  influenced  by  differences  in 
tax burdens.  Eventually therefore, closer align-
ment of these burdens will be necessary. 
Given the role of taxation as an instrument of 
economic and  social  policy,  such  a  move  to-
wards  alignment  is  equally  important  in  the 
context  of increasingly  close  coordination  of 
national  policies  and  the  framing  of genuine 
common policies in the key economic sectors. 
8.  Before  we  consider  the  measures  that 
would have to be  taken in  this respect, it  may 
be  useful  to  recapitulate the  measures  already 
decided upon or awaiting adoption. 
In addition, it  is  woqh emphasizing once again 
that the closer alignment of tax burdens which 
must be tackled will  be a  much  more difficult 
process  than  the  harmonization  of structures 
and bases of assessment, because it will conflict 
with  the  principle  that  countries  should  have 
complete latitude in their use of taxation as an. 
instrument of budgetary  policy  and economic 
and  social  policy  and  will  consequently have 
important repercussions. These are discussed in 
Chapter V.  Clearly, then, progress  will  have to 
be very cautious, the Member States must be al-
lowed  sufficient room  for  manoeuvre and the 
processes  of tax  harmonization and economic 
integration must keep in step. 
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Tax harmonization: Achievements 
and prospects 
Main measures adopted or to be adopted 
prior to closer alignment of tax burdens 
9.  The free movements of goods and the estab-
lishment of the customs union are the areas in 
which the Community has recorded its greatest 
success in  the tax field.  Following adoption by 
the Council in  1967 of the fist  two VAT Direc-
tives,  1 VAT has been introduced in the Member 
States,  superseding  the  cascade  tax  systems, 
which  had serious disadvantages.  Another im-
portant step forward in the harmonization pro-
cess was the Council's adoption in  1977 of the 
Sixth VAT Directive on the uniform basis of as-
sessment for VAT. 2 This measure was necessary 
not only for·the purpose of tax  neutrality but 
also to achieve another major objective, namely 
providing  the  Community  with  its  own  re-
sources. 
The C,ommission has put forward other propos-
als aimed at resolving a number of problems to 
which  no  comprehensive  and  definitive  solu-
tions had been supplied by the Sixth Directive. 
These problems concern: 
(i)  the refund of VAT  to  non-resident taxable 
persons; 
(ii)  the arrangements to be applied to the works 
of  art,  collectors'  items,  antiques  and  used 
goods;3 
(iii)  the arrangements to  be  applied to  hiring-
out of movable tangible property ;4 
(iv)  stores of vessels and aircraft ;s 
(v)  the  importation  of  goods  eligible  for  a 
non-tariff customs exemption.6 
To  date,  only  the  first  of these  proposals  has 
been adopted by the Council, in the form of an 
Eighth VAT Directive/ 
S.  1/80 
A number of other texts have still  to be final-
ized  by  the  Commission,  including  one  con-· 
cerning  the  temporary  importation  of certain 
means of production. In addition, the Commis-
sion plans to unveil shortly a multiannual pro-
gramme  for  the  simplification  of procedures 
and 'formalities  at  intra-Community  frontiers, 
since  these  are  unwieldy,  complicated  and 
costly and cause a great deal of inconvenience 
to firms, particularly smaller firms. 
I  0.  Effective free movement of goods also en-
tails harmonization of the systems of excise du-
ties,  notably  in  order  to  eliminate  the  many 
sources of divergence in this field, which are of-
ten bound up with  the very structure of excise 
duties. It was with  this in mind that the Com-
mission sent to the Council several years ago a 
programme for  harmonizing excise  duties that 
laid  down  which  excise  duties  were  to  be  re-
tained  and incorporated  arrangements  to  har-
monize their structures and ultimately to prev-
ent  the  Member  States  from  introducing  any 
new  excise  duties  necessitating  compensation 
arrangements or checks· at frontiers (framework 
directive8 and specific directives concerning to-
bacco, beer,8 wine,8 spiritss and mineral oils).9 
The  results  obtained  so  far  in  this  field  are 
rather disappointing: only the harmonization of 
excise duties on cigarettes has been decided on 
and achieved in part.10  In spite of an urgent re-
quest from the Commission, in its Communica-
tion of 2 August  1977, ll and in spite of the in-
fringement  proceedings12  initiated  against  the 
Member States, the  Council  has  not yet  acted 
on the other proposals before it, including those 
1  OJ71of14.4."1967. 
2  OJ  L  145  of  13.  6.  1977;  BulL  EC  5-1977,  points  1.3.1  to 
1.3.4. 
3  OJ  C  26  of  I. 2.  1978;  OJ  C  136  of 31. 5.  1979;  BulL  EC 
5-1979. point 2.1.45. 
•  OJ C  I 16 of 9.  5.  1979. 
''  OJ  C 3 I of 8. 2.  19SU.  llu II.  EC 1-1980. point 2. 1.19. 
•  OJ C 267 of 21.  II. 1975. 
1  OJ  L 331  of 27.  12.  1979. 
8  OJ C 43 of 29. 4.  1972. 
9  OJ C 92 of 31.  I 0.  1973. 
to  OJ L 338 of 28.  12.  1977. 
"  Bull. EC 7/8-1977. poim2.1.39. 
12  Notahly Bull.  EC 7/8-1978, points 2.3.51  to 2.3.54; BulL EC 
4-1979. point 2.3.41; Bull. EC 2-1980, points 2.1.26 to 2.1.30. 
9 concerning  alcoholic  beverages.  The  import-
ance of excise duties for the free movement of 
excisable  products  is  a  good  reason  why  top 
priority should now be given to the task of har-
monizing them.  It was with  this  in  mind  that 
the Commission sent to the Council on 26 June 
1979 another communication  1 on the matter. 
II.  With  a  view  to  the  free  movement  of 
goods but also of persons, the Community em-
barked  some  time  ago  on  a  policy  of intro-
ducing tax exemptions for private individuals. 
The  ~ouncil has adopted a  whole series of di-
rectives in  this field.  Exemptions were first  in-
troduced in  1969 and have since been gradually 
extended  and  improved.  The  four  latest  texts 
were adopted by the Council on  19 December 
19782 and 'concern the following: 
(i)  goods contained in  the personal  luggage of 
travellers crossing intra-Community frontiers; 
(ii)  goods contained in the luggage of travellers 
coming from third countries; 
(iii)  the importation of goods in small consign-
ments of a non-commercial character within the 
Community; 
(iv)  the importation of goods in small consign-
ments  of  a  non-commercial  character  from 
third countries. 
Two other Commission  proposals dating from 
1975  have  not  as  yet  been  adopted  by  the 
Council. They concern the temporary importa-
tion of certain means of transport and the per-
manent importation of personal property of in-
dividuals in the event of removal, marriage and 
inheritance.3 
The  Commission  would  like  to  press  ahead 
with  this  policy of progressively extending ex-
emptions in  accordance with  the objective laid 
down by the Council itself in its  Resolution of 
22 March  1971  on  economic  and  monetary 
union,4  but it is  aware that it will  be difficult to 
increase  the  amounts  of the  exemptions  sub-
stantially as  long as VAT and excise duty rates 
have not been brought somewhat more closely 
into  line,  because of the risks  of distortion  it 
would involve. 
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12.  With respect to the free  movement of per-
sons, the Commission sent the Council, in De-
cember  1979,  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  con-
cerning personal income tax  payable by  work-
ers  who  carry  on  their  activity  in  a  Member 
State  other  than  that  in  which  they  are  resi-
dents The purpose of the proposal is to elimi-
nate the discrimination and disadvantages with 
which such workers may have to contend. 
13.  The  efforts  made  to  establish  the  free 
movement  of capital,  to  decompartmentalize 
the  capital  markets  and  to  create  a  genuine 
common  market  for  capital  have  brought  tax 
measures  in  their  train.  International  capital 
movements are at present hampered by  mani-
fold tax obstacles such as  discrimination, dou-
ble  taxation  and  complicated  administrative 
formalities  which  further  seal  off the  capital 
markets.  What is  more, certain factors  such as 
differences in systems of company taxation and 
in  the rates of withholding tax may trigger ab-
normal  movements  of capital,  that  is  to  say, 
movements  prompted  by  tax  considerations 
and· not  by  financial  considerations  proper. 
Such movements are, moreover, liable to add to 
the difficulties of operating the European Mo-
netary System. 
It is  important, therefore, that these tax  obsta-
cles be removed and some degree of neutrality 
of taxation  introduced in  order to  ensure that 
capital  movements  and  the  sitting  of invest-
ment projects are not determined by tax consi-
derations but are made ih response to economic 
considerations  and  guanrantee  optimum  utili-
zation  of financial  resources  and  production 
factors  in  the  Community. The tax  factors  re-
ferred  to  above affect both direct and indirect 
taxation. 
With  regard  to  indirect  taxation,  the  Council 
has already adopted three directives on the har-
1  Bull.  EC 6-1979. point 2.1.39. 
'  OJ  L 366 of 28.  12.  1978; Bull. EC 12-1978. point2.1.54. 
'  OJ  C 267 of 21.  II. 1975. 
'  OJ C 28 of 27.  3.  1971. 
'  OJ C 21  of 26.  I. 1980; Bull. EC 12-1979. point2.1.58. 
s.  1/80 monization of capital duty payable by compan-
ies  (indirect  taxes  on  the  raising  of capita1). 1 
Under these  directives,  the  tax  rates  are  also 
harmonized. 
In addition, the Commission has transmitted to 
the Council a  proposal for a  Directive on the 
harmonization of indirect taxes on transactions 
in  securities,2  discussion of which  has  not yet 
begun.  In the longer term, the Commission in-
tends to propose the abolition of this tax, which 
is out of place in a modern tax system. 
With  regard  to  direct  taxation,  capital  move-
ments have a  bearing on the tax arrangements 
for  bond interest  and dividends. The  problem 
where bond interest is  concerned is  to harmon-
ize the systems of withholding tax. In  1973, the 
Commission came out in  favour of the princi-
ple of a substancial withholding tax3 of around 
25 % that would both satisfy the dictates of tax 
equity and meet the concern over social issues 
expressed  by  the  Heads  of State  or  Govern-
ment. At the same time, however, the Commis-
sion  stated  that  it  would  not  draw  up  a  pro-
posal  along  these  lines  until  the  Community 
was endowed with  the machinery for  monitor-
ing  capital  movements  at  external  frontiers. 
This is  necessary  in  order to  prevent the flight 
of capital from the Com'munity to  non-member 
countries  not  charging  withholding  tax.  Any 
such  outflow  of capital  would  be  particularly 
unwelcome at the present time, given the deficit 
in the Community's balance of payments. 
In  the  case  of dividends,  both the  systems  of 
withholding taxes and the systems of company 
taxation  need to  be  harmonized.  In  1975,  the 
Commission sent  to the Council an  important 
proposal  for  a  Directive4  providing  for  the 
adoption of a com!Uon system of company tax-
ation  granting  partial  relief from  double  eco-
nomic taxation of dividends through the intro-
duction of a tax credit and for the adoption of a 
harmonized  system  of  withholding  taxes  on 
dividends.  The Council,  however,  has  not  yet 
begun to examine the proposal in  earnest and, 
in  any  case, the  European  Parliament has still 
not delivered its opinion. 
14.  Like  the Community's other fundamental 
objectives,  its  common  policies  cannot  be 
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brought to fruition  without. recourse to the in-
strument of taxation. 
A typical example is  afforded by the common 
transport policy. One of the prime objectives of 
this  policy  is  that  each  mode  of  transport 
should bear its fair share of infrastructure costs. 
In the case of road haulage of road passenger 
transport the instrument chosen to achieve this 
objective is  taxation: in the final analysis, taxes 
on vehicles and on motor fuels will  have to be 
fixed in such a way that their yield in aggregate 
totals corresponds to the share of infrastructure 
costs to be borne by these vehicles. 
Industrial  policy  is  another  typical  example. 
The  1969  proposals  for  Directives  on  cross-
frontier company mergers and the tax treatment 
of parent companies and subsidiaries from dif-
ferent  Member  States5  are  likewise  aimed  at 
achieving a fundamental objective of industrial 
policy, namely  that companies should be  able 
to expand in  the response to the requirements 
of an  enlarged  market  and  to  improve  their 
competitiveness  world-wide.  Indeed,  it  is  ex-
tremely important that firms should be of a size 
to  handle  the  technical  and  economic  condi-
tions characterizing the modern production ap-
paratus,  to  exploit  the  scope  for  larger-scale 
production afforded by the establishment of the 
common market and to meet the requirements 
of increasing competition both within the Com-
munity and in  the world at large.  This  entails 
abolition of the tax obstacles to the creation of 
cross-frontier corporate groups (in which subsi-
diaries are controlled by a parent company) re-
sulting from  mergers  and the like  or from  the 
acquisition of extensive holdings, 
While  this  objective  has  generally  been 
achieved within national frontiers, this is not al-
ways true when cross-frontier takeovers or mer-
gers are planned. The two proposals mentioned 
above are aimed at remedying this situation. In 
'  OJ  L 249 of 3.  10.  1969: OJ  L 303 of 13.  II.  llJ74: OJ  L 103 
of 18. 4.  1973. 
'  OJ  C 133 of 14. 6.  1976. 
'  Seventh Gener;li Report. point 176. 
'  OJ C 253 of 5.  II.  1975: Supplement 10/75- Bull. EC. 
''  OJ C 39 of 22.  3.  1969. 
11 spite of a  number of Council resolutions  and 
the  concern  expressed  at the  1972  Paris  S\im-
mit,  these  proposals  have  still  not  been 
adopted, something which  at long last should 
be done  particularly  since,  without  them,  the 
Statute for European Companies cannot be im-
plemented. 
15.  The  introduction of arrangements  to en-
sure that competition is  not distorted is another 
important objective. 
In  the  field  of indirect taxation, the  measures 
taken in  respect of VAT ( 1967  Directives, uni-
form basis of assessment) and in respect of the 
harmonization of the structures of excise duties, 
whose  aim  is  to  secure  the  free  movement of 
goods  and  services,  also  contribute  to  the 
achievement of competition policy. 
As regards direct taxation, an initial step in this' 
direction was taken when, in  I  975,  the Council 
received the proposaJ•for a Directive on the har- · 
monizing of the systems of company taxation.1 
The proposal  lays  down  that the tax rates  will 
have to be within a 45-55% range in  all  Mem-
ber States. A second step forward will  be taken 
in  the  next  few  years,  when  the  Commission 
draws  up  proposals relating to the harmoniza-
tion  of the  bases  of assessment  for  taxes  on 
company  profits.  This  is  a  vast  field  that em-
braces a whole series of matters such as depre-
ciation, capital gains, stock valuation, carry-for-
ward of losses, exempt reserves, etc. 
Although there is no question at the moment of 
harmonizing  incentives,  of which  there  are  a 
great many in !his field  (and indeed they are a 
facet of each Member State's economic policy), 
it  is essential that a definition of a 'normal' ba-
sis  of assessment be agreed if we  are  to  elimi-
nate  distortions of competition, achieve  some 
measure of tax transparency and ensure that the 
closer alignment of rates is truly meaningful. 
16.  Alongside  the  harmonization  of tax  sys-
tems, the establishment of conditions of effec-
tive competition also requires specific action to 
combat tax avoidance. Tax avoidance and eva-
sion  beyond  Member  States'  frontiers  pose  a 
serious problem not only for the Member States 
but also for the Community. For each Member 
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State, it results in budgetary losses and infringe-
ments  of the  principle  of tax  equity;  for  the 
Community, it  is  liable to cause distortions  in 
capital  movements  and  in  the  conditions  of 
competition. Lastly, where VAT is concerned, it 
affects that portion of revenue accruing to the 
Community.  · 
To  be  effective,  measures  to  combat  interna-
tional tax avoidance and evasion can no longer 
be devised  on  a  national or bilateral  basis, on 
account of the  free  movement of persons and 
capital,  the  growing  interpenetration  of econ-
omies  and the growth  of multinationals;  they 
must be organized on the widest possible inter-
national  basis,  and  first  of all  at  Community 
level. It was these reasons which  prompted the 
Council, acting on a  proposal  from  the  Com-
mission, to adopt on  I  0 February 1975  a  Reso-
lution on the measures to be taken by the Com-
munity  in  order  tci  combat  international  tax 
evasion and avoidance,2  and to  follow  this up 
with  a  Directive, adopted in  1977,  concerning 
mutual assistance by the competent authorities 
of the Member States in the field of direct taxa-
tion.3 
In order, however, to ensure'that companies are 
not  penalized  when  profits  are  adjusted,  the 
Commission sent to the 'council in  1976 a pro-
posal  for  a  Directive4  designed  to  eliminate 
double taxation in  connection with the adjust- . 
ment of profits carried out by  a  Member State. 
The Council has  not as yet begun its  substan-
tive examination of the proposal. 
As regards VAT, the Commission has drawn up 
two  proposals  for  Directives;  one of them  is 
siQ1ilar to that on direct taxation adopted by the 
Council,  while  the  other concerns  mutual  as-
sistance  in  the  recovery  of VAT  claims.  The 
Couneil  adopted both  proposals on 6 Decem-
ber 1979.5 
1  Point  13;  OJ  C  253  of 5.  II.  1975;  Supplement  10/75  -
BulL EC 
2  OJ C 35 of 14. 2.  1975. 
3  OJ L336of27. 12.1977; Bull. EC 11-1977.point2.1.51. 
•  OJ C 301  of 21.  12.  1976. 
''  OJ L 331  of 27.  12.  1979; Bull. EC 12-1975, point 2.1.55. 
s. 1180 The Commission will  press ahead with this pol-
icy  of combating tax avoidance in  the coming 
years,  among other things by  endeavouring to 
introduce more effective monitoring of transfer 
prices set by groups of companies. 
Measures to be taken in the years ahead 
with a view to achieving a greater degree 
of economic integration 
17.  While, as stated above, it is not possible to 
determine  at  present  all  the  tax  measures 
needed  to  establish  a  genuine  economic  and 
monetary  union,  the  Commission  feels  that 
priority will have to be given to two objectives: 
(i)  in the field of indirect taxation, it will be ne-
cessary to create a single market, that is  to say, 
a market with characteristics similar to those of 
a  domestic  market.  This  objective  can  be 
achieved in  full  only if tax  frontiers  are  abol-
ished, i.e.  if the taxation of imports, the remis-
sion of tax on exports and checks at intra-Com~ 
munity frontiers are discontinued; 
(ii)  in  the  field  of direct  taxation,  firms'  tax 
burdens  will  have  to  be  brought  more  closely 
into line so that production costs, the location 
of investment  projects  and  the  return  on  in-
vested capital in  the Member States are  not in-
fluenced  to  unduly  differing  degrees  by  taxa-
tion and so  conditions of fair  competition be-
tween  firms  in  different Member States can be 
established. 
To these two objectives; there may one day  be 
added a third, the use of taxation as  an instru-
ment of common policies if, as is desirable, they 
finally gain  momentum; however, the measures 
to  be  taken  in  this  field  can  be  spelt out only 
once  these  objectives  have  themselves  been 
clearly defined. 
18.  Abolition of tax frontiers has been an ob-
jective of the  Community  since  its  inception. 
Express provision for the abolition of tax fron-
tiers in  the VAT field was made in  the First Di-
rective,1  dated 1967. The main snag here is  that 
this  objective  cannot be attained  unless  VAT 
and excise duty rates have been aligned closely 
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enough.  Admittedly,  the  VAT  deduction  sys-
tem, which should be  extended to transactions 
between  taxable  persons  in  different  Member 
States,  does  not,  in  theory,  necessitate  any 
closer alignment of rates.  But  the  system  does 
not apply to non-taxable persons; and the dan-
ger of evasion by  taxable persons cannot be ig-
nored. ·For these  reasons,  closer  alignment  of 
tax rates is  essential in order to ensure that dif-
ferences  between  rates  do  not  engender  sub-
stantial deflections of trade, notably in frontier 
regions. This  is  an even more serious  problem 
in  the case of excise  duties, where rates differ 
much  more  widely  than VAT  rates  and where 
the amount of duty payable may account for a 
very  substantial  proportion  of the  price  of a 
product. 
Where  excise  duties  are  concerned, the  closer 
alignment of rates may also have a bearing on 
common policies. For instance, the common or-
ganization of the market in wine, which was es-
tablished  to  guarantee  and  facilitate  the  dis-
posal of wine, will  never operate entirely satis-
factorily  as  long  as  the  Member  States  retain 
complete  autonomy  with  regard  to  the  excise 
duty on  wine: the reason is  that they can take 
tax measures whose effects, not to say aims, run 
counter to  the  objectives  pursued  on the  agri-
cultural front- for example, an increase in the . 
excise duty tend& to reduce wine consumption. 
This  has  actually  happened:  shortly  after  the 
Commission had recommended a reduction in 
the excise  duty for agricultural  policy reasons, 
some  Member States  announced a  substantial 
increase. 
Another problem in this area is that, contrary to 
what  can  be  done elsewhere,  the  tax  frontiers 
cannot be abolished progressively. Elimination 
of frontier checks is dependent on the simulta-
neous alignment - to  the extent necessary -
of VAT  and all  excise  duty· rates.  As  long  as 
there  are  marked  differences  in  the  rates  of 
even  one  of these  taxes,  frontier  checks  will 
have to continue.2 
'OJ71ofl4.4.1967. 
2  It must not be forgotten that frontier checks are carried out 
not  only for tax  reasons but also for health (including plant 
health). statistical and general regulatory reasons. 
13 Closer  alignment  of rates  does  not,  however, 
mean uniform rates.  It is  likely that some dis-
parities can be tolerated without undue incon-
venience,  although  prior  studies  would  be 
needed  to  determine  the  acceptable  spread. 
Rates cannot be brought more closely into line, 
tho~gh, unless a number of preconditions have 
been met. 
With  regard  to  VAT,  adoption by  the Council 
of the  proposals referred  to  in  point 9  is  one 
such precondition, the others being: 
(a)  full and complete harmonization of  the basis 
of assessment,  in  particular  by  discontinuing 
the derogations from the principle of a uniform 
basis of assessment; 
(b) a decision must be taken as  to whether the 
Community system  is  to  have one rate or sev-
eral; in the latter case, the relationship between 
the  rates  must  be  fixed  and the list  of goods 
and  services  chargeable  at  the  different  rates 
must  be  drawn  up.  At  present, the  number of 
VAT rates ranges from one in Denmark to eight 
in Italy. 
With regard to excise duties, the harmonization 
of structures  under way for  manufactured  to-
bacco  must  be  completed.  In  addition,  the 
Council must adopt the proposals sent to it by 
the  Commission concerning the  other four ex-
cise  duties  requiring  harmonization1  (those on 
heer.  spirits,  wine  and  mineral  oils),  and  any 
other charges of this sort must be abolished and 
prohibited, except for those not entailing fron-
tier  checks,  such  as  entertainments  or  betting 
tax. 
If tax frontiers are to be abolished, the problem 
of allocating  tax  revenue  accruing  from  VAT 
and  excise  duties  must  also  be  settled.  For 
VAT,  one  possible  solution  would  be  to  allo-
cate to the country of origin the total amount of 
revenue from  the sale of goods and services to 
non~resident non-taxable persons - as  is  cur-
rent  practice  under the  system  of tax  exemp-
tions - and to  the country of destination the 
total  amount of revenue from  transactions be-
tween taxable persons. In the latter case, an ap-
propriate  financial  compensation  mechanism 
would have to be introduced. For excise duties, 
14 
the solutions adopted could be guided by simi-
lar principles. For instance, excise duties levied 
on  sales  to  non-resident  non-taxable  persons 
would  still  accrue  to  the  country  of  origin, 
while excise duties on products traded between 
taxable persons would accrue to the country of 
destination.  Here  too, appropriate  moni_toring 
and  compensation  arrangements  would  be 
needed. 
19.  As  regards  taxes  on  company  profits,  it 
was  mentioned  above  that  the  Commission 
will,  in  the  next  year  or  so,  submit  proposals 
concerning the relevant basis of assessment.  In 
addition, however, the Council must adopt the 
1975  proposal on the harmonization of the sys-
tems of company taxation and the systems of 
withholding taxes on dividends.2  In  the longer 
·term. the closer alignment of the rates of corpo-
ration tax that will be triggered by this proposal 
will  have to  be  taken further.  Two other prob-
lems  will  have to be tackled:  namely,  whether 
the wealth tax should be made generally appli-
cable to enterprises or abolished; and how the 
tax burden on profits earned by companies not 
subject to corporation tax is to be treated. 
Lastly, thought will  have to be given to the in-
vestment incentives granted by Member States, 
in  connection with  the basis of assessment for 
taxes  on  profits.  It  would be going too far to 
consider  harmonizing  such  incentives,  since 
they  are  tailored to situations that are  not the 
same everywhere. Rather, some degree of coor-
dination is needed. Indeed, bearing in mind the 
objective of a fully fledged economic and mon-
etary union, it is inconceivable that such measures 
should  be  taken  by  the  Member States  with-
out  being  dovetailed  into  an  overall  policy 
even where, as aids, they do not in fact conflict 
with  the  Treaty.  As  and  when  jointly  agreed 
economic  policies  are  framed  and  imple-
mented,  it  will  become increasingly  necessary 
to coordinate the use of taxation as an interven-
tion instrument. 
1  Point  10. 
'Point13:0J C253of5. II. 1975. 
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Analysis of tax structures in the 
Member States and of changes in 
structure in recent years 
General 
20.  The changes in  each Member State in  the 
structure and burden of taxation during the per-
iod  from  1973  to  1977  are  shown  in  the  an-
nexed tables which have been drawn up using 
data  provided  by  the  Statistical  Office  of the 
European Communities. As  an  analysis focus-
ing on taxes only cannot provide a  valid com-
parison  between  States  owing  to  the  different 
methods of financing  social  security  (taxes  or 
contributions),  all  the  calculations  have  been 
made on the basis of total receipts from  taxes 
and actual social contributions. 
Each  table distinguishes  between  personal  in-
come taxes (including local taxes and withhold-
ing  taxes),  corporation  tax,  wealth  taxes  (in-
cluding estate duties), VAT,  the five  major ex-
cise duties (on beer, wine, spirits, tobacco and 
mineral oils), other taxes, levies accruing to the 
European  Communities1  (ECSC  levy,  sugar 
levies,  customs duties,  agricultural  levies)  and 
actual social contributions. 
Each tax or contribution is  shown as a percen-
tage of total receipts from  taxes and actual so-
cial contributions· and as  a  percentage of gross 
domestic product at market prices. 
A  brief  analysis  of  these  tables  by  Member 
State is also annexed hereto. 
The survey which follows comprises: 
(a)  two  summary  tables  covering  all  Member 
States, one for 1973 and the other for 1977; 
(b)  four  graphs  showing,  for  each  Member 
State, the respective  trends of corporation tax, 
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VAT,  the  total  of the  five  excise  duties  to  be 
harmonized  and total  receipts  from  taxes  and 
actual social contributions, and the differences 
between Member States in these areas; 
(c)  comments. 
Comments 
21.  Total receipts from  taxes and social con-
tributions show major structural differences be-
tween one Member State and another: 
(i)  in  the  case  of  income  and  wealth  taxes 
taken  together,  France has  the  lowest  propor-
tion and Denmark the highest ( 16 % of the total 
compared  with  61%  in  1973,  18% compared 
with  58.9%  in  1977).  The  difference,  even 
though slightly reduced, is still very substantial; 
(ii)  in  the  case of VAT,  it is  the United King-
dom and France which are at the two extremes 
(6.8% in  the United  Kingdom  compared with 
24% in  France in  1973,  8.2 % compared with 
21.2%  in  1977).  However,  it  should be noted 
that,  following  the  substantial  increase  in  the 
standard VAT  rate  in  the  United  Kingdom  in 
the spring of t'979,  future figures relating to that 
country will  be much higher.2  Nevertheless, the 
difference between the two countries will  prob-
ably remain fairly large; 
(iii)  in the case of the five  major excise duties 
taken together,  France  has  the  lowest  propor-
tion  and  Ireland the  highest  (7.1  %  compared 
with  24.8 %  in  1973,  5.4%  compared  with 
21.2% in  1977). The difference is still very sub-
stantial; 
1  The figures  concerning the levies accruing to the Commu-
nities should be interpreted with caution and do not permit a 
valid  comparison  between  one State  and  the next.  since  in 
some States,  such as  the  Netherlands, a  large  proportion of 
customs duties and agricultural  levies  relate to  products in-
tended  for  the  domestic  markets  of other  Member  States. 
whereas the opposite is  true in other States. such as  Luxem-
bourg. 
2  Forecasts put  the extra annual receipts at  more than  UKL 
4 000  million. or more than 8% of total  receipts from  taxes 
estimated for  1979/80. 
15 (iv)  finally, in the case of social contributions, 
we  observe  an  increase  in  their share  in  most 
Member States and a quite special situation in 
Denmark owing to the fact that social security 
expenditure is financed mainly through tax. For 
this reason, there are enormous differences be-
tween the two extremes (in  1973,  1.9% in Den-
mark and 41.2% in Italy; in 1977,  1.2% in Den-
mark and 41.9% in France). 
22.  As  regards the  tax  burden, it  can be  seen 
that  during  the  period  1973-77,  total  receipts 
from  taxes  and social  contributions  increased 
in  all  Member  States.  However,  this  increase 
was  more  marked  in  some  countries  than  in 
others.  Luxembourg, for example recorded the 
highest increase (from 35.2% of GNP to 49.4 %) 
and  Denmark  the  lowest  (from  42.5 %  to 
42.6 %). 
·The total tax burden (total receipts from  taxes 
and  social  contributions  as  a  percentage  of 
GDP)  varies  very  considerably  between  one 
country and the next.  In  1973, the greatest dif-
ference  was between  Italy and the Netherlands 
(30.6% as against 44.5 %)  and in  1977  between 
Italy  and  Luxembourg  (34.6%  as  against 
49.4 %).  While  the  percentages  increased,  the 
size of the difference was unchanged. 
As regards the weight of the main taxes and the 
trend between 1973 and 1977, the situation is as 
follows: 
(i)  the share of personal income taxes increased 
continually in  all  Member States  except  Den-
mark during the period in question. The highest 
increases  were  in  Italy from  4.6% of GDP to 
8%, in  Belgium  from  10.4% to  14.6% and in 
Luxembourg from  7.8 % to 11.1  %.  The greatest 
difference was again between France and Den-
mark (in  1973,  3.4% of GDP in  France  com-
pared with 22.3% in Denmark, in  1977,4.8% in 
France  compared  with  21.6 o/o  in  Denmark). 
Even  though it  has been reduced slightly, this 
difference remains extremely large; 
(ii)  the corporation tax trend varied according 
to country during the period. However, over the 
last two years, this tax's share in  total  receipts 
has fallen  everywhere to a greater or lesser ex-
tent,  except  in  Luxembourg  where  it  has  in-
16 
creased.  This  very  special  situation  m  the 
Grand  Duchy  is  probably  explained  by  the 
large number of companies in that country, par-
ticularly in the banking sector. 
In  1973, receipts from this source were equiva-
lent to  0.46% of GDP in  Italy  and 4.06% of 
GDP in  Luxembourg, whereas in  1977 the cor-
responding figures were 0.98 % and 6.67 %. This 
shows that the widest spread increased between 
1973 and 1977; 
(iii)  the  trend  of wealth  taxes  also  varied  ac-
cording to  Member State.  The greatest differ-
ence was  between  Italy and the  United  King-
dom (0.14% of GDP in Italy in  1973  compared 
with 4.63% in the United Kingdom, and 0.06% 
compared with 4.46% in  1977).  It can therefore 
be seen that the difference is  fairly  substantial 
and has remained virtually constant; 
(iv)  VAT  showed  little  change  in  all  Member 
States during the period in question. As  already 
pointed out, the two extremes were the United 
Kingdom  and  France.  Expressed  as  percen-
tages  of GDP, the figures  for  these  two coun-
tries were, respectively, 2.2% and 8.6% in  1973 
and 3% and 8.3% in  1977; 
(v)  the total for the five major excise duties var-
ied according to  Member State, although only 
to a limited extent: there was a relative increase 
in  Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg, and a fall 
in the other countries. 
In the case of the five excise duties, it  has also 
already been pointed out that the greatest dif-
ference  was ·between  France  and  Ireland.  Ex-
pressed as  percentages of GDP, the figures  for 
these  two  countries  were,  respectively,  2.5% 
and 7.9  o/o  in  1973  and 2.1% and 7.5% in  1977. 
The difference of slightly more than 5 percen-
tage points remains virtually constant; 
(vi)  finally, social contributions were of course 
lowest throughout the period in Denmark, while 
they were highest in  Italy in  1973  and in  France 
in 1977 (0.82% of GDP in Denmark in  1973  as 
against 12.38% in  Italy; 0.53 o/o  in  Denmark in 
1977  as  against  16.47  o/o  in  France).  It can  be 
seen that the difference here is enormous and is 
tending to increase. 
s. 1/80 Conclusion 
23.  Tables I and 2 and Graphs I to 4 and the 
comments  on  them  highlight  the  differences 
which  exist  between  Member  States  in  the 
structure of total receipts from  taxes and .social 
contributions,  in  the  weight  of these  receipts 
and in that of their main components, and the 
changes in these differences. 
Whether we  consider the  structure  of total  re-
ceipts,  the  overall  tax  burden  or  the  relative 
weight  of particular taxes, we  see  that the dif-
ferences  between  the  extremes  are  still  large 
and sometimes even very large.  In some cases, 
the difference in  1977  narrowed compared with 
that in  1973, although so slightly as to make the 
change insignificant.  In  other cases, the differ-
ence remains virtually constant. In  the case of 
corporation taxes, it has actually increased. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  one  interesting  area  of 
convergence: the relative weight of personal in-
come taxes  has  increased in  all  countries,  e·x-
cept in  Denmark.1  In some Member States, like 
France and Italy, the increase primarily reflects 
deliberate  policy.  In  all  Member States,  how-
ever, this  phenomenon is  probably also  linked 
with  inflation  which  pushes up the tax burden 
on incomes if scales are inadequately adjusted 
and produces a fall in  the relative share of spe-
cific  excise  duties  which  are  not regularly  ad-
justed  in  line  with  the  rate  of inflation.  This 
phenomenon is most marked in Italy, but is also 
very  clear  in  France.  For  this  reason,  these 
countries, in which the share of direct taxes has 
traditionally  been  the  lowest,  are  tending  to 
draw slightly nearer to the others. 
The major differences seen are clearly not likely 
to  facilitate  the  harmonization  of  tax  rates 
among Member States. They make it necessary 
for  the  Community to  move  in  this  direction 
only with great caution and little by little so as 
to avoid sudden upheavals which would be in-
tolerable at national level. 
1  However, ·Denmark maintains its  lead  as  regards the rela-
tive weight of these taxes. 
s.  1/80  17 :;  Table 1- Structure of  total receipts from taxes and social contributions and the tax burden: 1973 
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"  00 
0 
Belgium  FR of Germany  Denmark  France 
Taxes and social contributions 
I  I  I 
a  b  a  b  a  b  a 
Personal income taxes 
(including local taxes and 
withholding taxes)  27.20  10.41  27.72  10.43  52.39  22.25  9.65 
Corporation tax  8.00  3.05  3.51  1.32  3.12  1.32  5.75 
Wealth taxes 
(including estate duties)  0.81  0.30  2.81  1.06  5.48  2.33  0.57 
Total  36.01  13.76  34.04  12.81  60.99  25.90  15.97 
VAT  17.60  6.71  14.41  5.42  17.86  7.58  24.04 
Excise duty on beer  0.40  0.15  0.37  0.14  1.73  0.74  0.08 
Excise duty on wine  0.20  0.06  0.09  0.04  0.32  0.14  0.11 
Excise duty on spirits  0.50  0.19  0.92  0.35  1.13  0.48  0.89 
Excise duty on tobacco  1.55  0.58  2.57  0.97  3.54  1.50  1.55 
Excise duty on mineral oils  4.80  1.81  4.80  1.81  2.34  0.99  4.48 
Total of these excise duties  7.45  2.79  8.75  3.29  9.06  3.85  7.11 
Other taxes  6.08  2.32  9.84  3.70  9.78  4.15  14.64 
Total of national taxes  67.10  25.58  67.04  25.23  97.69  41.48  61.76 
Various levies accruing to the 
European Communities  1.35  0.51  0.91  0.34  0.37.  0.16  0.64 
Total tax receipts  68.45  26.09  67.95  25.51  98.06  41.64  62.40 
Actual social contributions  31.55  12.04  32.05  12.06  1.94  0.82  37.60 
Overall total  100.00  38.13  100.00  37.63  100.00  42.46  100.00 
a  -share of the various taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions. 




















Ireland  Italy-·  Luxembourg 
a  I 
b  a  I 




25.78  8.27  15.04  '4.61  22.24  7.83 
2.65  0.85  1.34  0.46  11.52  4.06 
10.23  3.28  0.48  0.14  1.72  0.60 
38.66  12.40  16.86  5.21  35.48  12.49 
-
15.94  5.11  15.12  4.67  10.87  3.83 
5.51  1.79  0.16  0.05  0.32  0.11 
0.30  0.09  - - 0.19  0.06 
4.64  1.49  0.50  0.15  0.72  0.25 
7.64  2.45  2.94  0.90  1.92  0.67 
6.62  2.12  8.14  2.46  4.64  1.63 
24.77  7.94  11.74  3.56  7.79  2.72 
9.07  2.91  14.01  4.46  16.99  5.99 
88.44  28.36  57.73  17.90  71.13  25.03 
0.71  0.23  1.04  0.31  0.89  0.31 
89.15  28.59  58.81  18.21  72.02  25.34 
10.85  3.48'  41.23  12.38  27.98  9.87 
100.00  32.07  100.00  30.59  100.00  35.21 
-···-
Netherlands  United Kingdom 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
26.70  11.87  29.86  10.04 
6.67  2.97  7.57  2.55 
1.43  0.64  13.78  4.63 
34.80  15.48  51.21  17.22 
14.92  6.63  6.76  2.27 
0.28  0.13  1.61  0.54 
0.12  0.05  0.41  0.14 
0.72  0.32  1.99  0.67 
1.39  0.62  4.51  1.52 
3.17  1.41  6.55  2.20 
5.68  2.53  15.o7  5.07 
5.38  2.39  9.18  3.09 
60.78  27.03  82.22  27.65 
1.33  0.59  0.71  0.24 
62.11  27.62  82.93  27.89 
37.89  16.85  17.o7  5.74 
100.00  44.47  100.00  33.63 





Belgium  FR of Germany  Denmark  France 
Taxes and social contributions 
I  I  I 
a  b  a  b  a  b  a 
Personal income taxes 
(including local taxes and 
withholding taxes)  33.05  14.56  28.29  11.26  50.72  21.60  12.15 
Corporation tax  6.15  2.70  4.13  1.64  3.08  1.31  5.40 
Wealth taxes 
(including estate duties)  0.80  0.34  2.95  1.18  5.04  2.15  0.43 
Total  40.00  17.60  35.37  14.08  58.84  25.06  17.98 
VAT  16.54  7.29  13.13  5.23  18.95  8.07  21.17 
Excise duty on beer  0.30  0.13  0.27  0.11  1.59  0.68  0.04 
Excise duty on wine  0.19  0.08  0.09  0.04  0.45  0.19  0.06 
Excise duty on spirits  0.46  0.20  0.79  0.31  1.26  0.54  0.78 
Excise duty on tobacco  1.43  0.62  2.05  0.82  3.29  1.40  0.75 
Excise duty on mineral oils  3  .. 33  1.46  4.02  1.60  2.54  1.08  3.78 
Total of these excise duties  5.71  2.49  7.22  2.88  9.13  3.89  5.41 
Other taxes  5.15  2.26  9.08  3.61  11.02  4.70  12.78 
Total of national taxes  67.40  29.64  64.80  25.80  97.94  41.72  57.34 
Various levies accruing to the 
European Communities  1.92  0.84  1.13  0.45  0.82  0.35  0.74 
Total tax receipts  69.32  30.48  65.93  26.25  98.76  42.07  '58.08 
Actual social contributions  30.68  13.56  34.07  13.56  1.24  0.53  41.92 
Overall total  100.00  44.04  100.00  39.81  100.00  42.60  100.00 
a =share of the various taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions. 




















Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg 
a  I .  b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
27.63  9.72  23.39  8.02  22.31  11.06 
4.11  1.44  2.57  0.98  13.41  6.67' 
6.70  2.36  0.18  0.06  1.23  0.60 
38.44  13.52  26.14  9.06  36.95  18.33 
16.99  5.98  15.30  5.35  9.29  4.59 
5.14  1.81  0.11  0.04  0.32  0.16 
0.29  0.10  - - 0.15  0,07 
3.60  1.27  0.27  0.09  0.55  0.27 
4.67  1.64  2.16  0.74  2.00  0.99 
7.50  2.64  8.12  2.82  3.39  1.67 
21.20  7.46  10.66  3.69  6.41  3.16 
6.49  2.28  7.32  2.52  15.73  7.78 
83.12  29.24  59.42  20.62  68.38  33.86 
3.95  1.39  1.55  0.53  0.73  0.26 
87.07  30.63  60.97  21.15  69.11  34.12 
12.93  4.55  39.03  13.38  30.89  15.27 
100.00  35.18  100.00  34.53  100.00  49.39 
Netherlands  United Kingdom 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
25.86  12.17  34.21  12.59 
6.65  3.13  5.58  2.05 
1.89  0.89  12.13  4.46 
34.40  16.19  51.92  19.10 
15.68  7.38  8.22  3.03 
0.21  0.10  1.69  0.62 
0.14  0,07  0.53  0.20 
0.70  0.33  1.60  0.59 
1.18  0.55  ~.39  1.62 
2.50  1.18  4.49  1.65 
4.73  2.23  12.70  4.68 
4.99  2.35  6.47  2.38 
59.80  28.15  79.31  29.19 
2.04  0.96  1.29  0.47 
61.84  29.11  80.60  29.66 
.18.16  17.96  19.40  7.14 
100.00  47.07  100.00  36.80 Graph l 
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s.  1/80  23 Chapter IV 
Analysis of the main taxes to be 
harmonized 
24.  This Chapter gives a brief analysis of the 
main taxes to be harmonized, namely VAT, the 
five  major excise duties (on beer, spirits, wine, 
tobacco and mineral oils) and corporation tax. 
It does not contain conclusions, since these will 
be drawn in  Chapter V and VI.  Furthermore, in 
the case of company taxation, it is restricted to 
corporation  tax  and does  not take  account of 
the wealth tax applied in some Member States 
or,  where  they  exist,  other  (generally  local) 
taxes such as the business tax in France, the tax 
on industry and trade in Germany or the com-
mune trade tax in  Luxembourg, although these 
may represent a considerable burden. 
Value added tax 
The rules governing the basis of 
assessment 
25.  The adoption on 17 May 1977 of the Sixth 
Directive1  (common  system  of VAT:  uniform 
basis assessment) was motivated mainly by the 
need to ensure that the  Community's own  re-
sources from VAT were collected equitably. 
The  Directive  is  therefore  mainly  concerned 
with  harmonizing all  those provisions likely to 
affect  the  amount  of VAT  own  resources,  in 
particular the rules governing liability, the defi-
nition of taxable transactions, taxable amounts 
and chargeable event, etc. 
On  some  points,  however,  the  Directive  stip-
ulates that the Council will  later decide on the 
arrangements for applying principles laid down 
in the Directive; while on others it allows Mem-
ber  States  to  derogate  temporarily  from  the 
common proYisions.  Although the Sixth  Direc-
24 
tive therefore represents a decisive step towards 
the harmonization of VAT,  it is  far from  com-
pleting the  process.  As  already pointed out in 
Chapter II,  the  harmonization  of the  basis  of 
assessment must first be completed. This task is 
currently  being  carried  out.  The  problem  of 
rates must be tackled in the next stage. 
The following points give a summary outline of 
the sometimes substantial  differences  between 
the  systems  of rates  in  force  in  the  Member 
States. 
The VAT rates in force in each Member 
State 
26.  Technically speaking, the  'zero rate' can-
not be considered a real rate of taxation; it re-
presents an exemption with refund of input tax 
and is little used in  most Member States. How-
ever,  being  widely  applied in  Ireland and the 
United  Kingdom,  the  'zero  rate'  must  be  in-
cluded  among the  rates  in  force  in  these  two 
Member States, since the analysis of their VAT 
systems would otherwise be incomplete. On the 
other hand, account need not be  taken  of the 
'flat rates  for  farmers',  which  are  not taxation 
rates but flat-rate percentages calculated to en-
able farmers to offset the VAT charge on inputs. 
Taking into account the above, the situation on 
I July 1979 was as follows: 
Belgium (three rates) 
standard rate 
- reduced rate 
- increased rate 
Denmark (one rate) 
- single rate 
FR ofGermany(two rates) 
- standard rate 
- reduced rate 
France (three rates) 
- standard rate 
- reduced rate 










'  OJ  L  145  of  13:6.  1977;  Bull.  EC  5-1977.  points  1.3.1  to 
1.3.4. 
s. 1/80 Ireland (three rates) 
- standard rate 
- reduced rate 
- zero rate 
Italy (eight rates) 
- standard rate 
- reduced rates 
- increased rate 
- intermediate rate 
Luxembourg (three rates) 
- standard rate 
- reduced rates 
Netherlands (two rates) 
- standard rate 
- reduced rate 
United Kingdom (two rates) 
20 o/o 




35  o/o  . 
18  o/o 
I  0 o/o 
5 and 2 o/o 
18 o/o 
4% 
- standard rate  15 o/o 
- zero rate  0 o/o 
There are clearly considerable differences as re-
gards the number of rates, there being a single 
rate in Denmark and eight rates in Italy. In sev- · 
era!  Member States, however, there has been a 
tendency for the number of rates to be reduced: 
for  example,  France  and  Belgium  have  abol-
ished the intermediate rate and Ireland and the 
United Kingdom have abolished the increased 
rates. 
Rate levels have tended to increase in six of the 
nine Member States during the last ten years: 
FR of  Germany: 
the  standard  rate  has  increased  from  I  0 o/o 
(1968) to 13  o/o  (1979) 
the reduced rate has increased from  5 o/o  ( 1968) 
to 6.5  o/o  (1979) 
Ireland: 
the  standard rate  has  increased  from  16.37% 
(1972) to 20% (1979) 
the  reduced  rate  has  increased  from  5.25% 
(1972) to 10 o/o  (1979) 
Denmark: 
the single rate  has  increased from  10 o/o  ( 1967) 
to 20.25 % ( 1979) 
Italy: 
the  standard  rate  has  increased  from  12 % 
(1973) to 14% (1979) 
s. 1/80 
the  increased  rate  has  increased  from  18 % 
(1973) to 35% (1979) 
Luxembourg: 
the standard rate has increased from 8 % ( 1970) 
to 10% (1979) 
Netherlands: 
the  standard  rate  has  increased  from  12 % 
(1969)to 18%(1979) 
In  Belgium,  the level  of the standard rate  has 
fallen (from  18% in  1971  to  16% in  1979), but 
most goods  and services  previously subject to 
the  14% intermediate  rate  (abolished  as  from 
I January 1978) are now subject to the standard 
rate of 16%. 
France  has  also reduced the level  of the stan-
dard rate, from 20 % in 1968 to  17.60 % in 1979; 
over the  same  period,  however,  the  increased 
rate has gone up from 25  o/o  in 1968 to 33!f3% in 
1979  and the reduced rate from  6.38 % in  1968 
to 7% in  1979, while goods and services subject 
to the 14.92% intermediate rate in  1968 are now 
taxed at 17.60 o/o. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the standard rate  has 
increased from  10% in  1973  to  15% in  1979, 
while  the  increased  rate,  introduced  in  1974, 
has been abolished. 
The coverage of  the various rates 
Reduced rates and zero rate 
27.  In all Member States (except for Denmark 
which  applies a single rate), application of re-
duced rates or a zero rate is obviously aimed at 
reducing  or  even  eliminating the  VAT  charge 
on 'essential' products and services. 
The  broad categories of products and services 
which  benefit  wholly  or  in  part,  from  the  re-
duced and zero rates are as follows: agricultural 
and foods  products  (D,  B,  F,  I,  IRL,  L,  NL, 
UK); pharmaceutical and medical products (D, 
B,  F,  IRL,  I,  L,  UK); books, newspapers, etc. 
(D,  B,  F,  IRL,  I,  L,  N, UK); fabrics, clothing, 
footwear (1, IRL, UK). 
25 However, it should be emphasized that, in each 
country, a  small  or large  number of products 
and  services  in  these  different  categories  are 
subject to other rates,  which of course distorts 
competition  between  products that are substi-
tutes for one another.  · 
Increased rates 
28.  In some Member States, application of in-
creased  rates  is  designed to  increase the VAT 
charge  on  certain  categories  of 'luxury'  pro-
ducts: motor cars (B,  F,  I); consumer durables: 
radios, televisions, refrigerators, etc. (B); jewel-
lery, furs,  perfume and cosmetics (B,  F); spirits 
(B, 1). 
Problems of distortion of competition between 
products  that  are  substitutes  for  one  another 
also arise where increased rates are applied. 
The relative percentage shares of  the 
different rates in the overall basis of 
assessment for VAT 
29.  Owing to the peculiarities of each national 
VAT system, the extent to which the standard, 
reduced  and  increased  rates  are  used  varies 
greatly between the  Member States. These dif-
ferences  are particularly evident in the case of 
the zero rate, which  covers  a  minimal propor-
tion of the overall basis of assessment in some 
··countries (e.g.  0.67% in  Belgium)  but plays a 
major part in other Member States (e.g. approx-
imately 36 % of the basis of assessment in Ire-
land). 
It is  of course impossible to make a  compari-
son, as  regards  the relative share of each rate, 
between a country like Italy which applies eight 
rates and one like the Federal Republic of Ger-
many which applies only two; however, appre-
ciable  differences  exist  even  between  States 
which apply the same number of rates. 
In· the  Netherlands, for  example, the standard 
rate and the reduced rate are applied to approx-
imately 71  % and 29% respectively of the basis 
of assessment, whereas in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the respective shares are approxi-
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mately 78 o/o and 20 %. The relative shares of the 
three rates in force in  France are approximately 
69 o/o  for  the standard rate, approximately 26% 
for the reduced rate and approximately 5% for 
the  increased  rate,  whereas  in  Belgium  these 
three  rates  account  for  approximately  61  %, 
32 o/o  and 7 o/o  respectively of the basis of assess-
ment. 
30.  As  regards the weight of VAT,  the differ-
ence in  the  coverage of the  rates  prevent any 
valid comparison on the basis of the different 
nominal rates. To provide some idea of the im-
pact of VAT, the following table shows how the 
weight of this tax, expressed as a percentage of 
national  final  consumption  (at  current  prices 
and exchange rates),  varied  during the  period 
1974-77.  Although this statistical concept does 
not  coincide  with  the  basis  of assessment  for 
VAT, it nevertheless represents a sufficient ap-
proximation. 
Table 3 - Changes  in  the  weight of VA T 
(in%) 
1974  1975  1976  1977 
Belgium  9.5  8.5  9.3  9.3 
FR of Germany  7.2  6.8  6.8  6.9 
Denmark  9.4  8.7  8.5  10.1 
France  11.9  11.2  11.4  10.8 
Ireland  6.0  5.7  6.7  7.2 
Italy  6.5  5.4  6.3  6.9 
Luxembourg  6.1  6.5  6.3  6.6 
Netherlands  8.7  8.7  9.1  9.6 
United Kingdom  3.8  3.9  3.8  3.8 
The  differences  therefore  remain  substantial, 
even though the gap between the United King-
dom  and  the  other  Member  States  has  nar-
rowed greatly since the second half of 1979 fol-
lowing  the  substantial  increase  in  the  United 
Kingdom standard VAT rate on  18  June  1979 
from 8 % to 15 %. 
The use of  VAT as an instrument of 
short-term economic policy 
31.  The  differences  between  the  various  na-
tional situations may widen or narrow tempor-
s. 1/80 arily  when  VAT  is  used  for  short-term  eco-
nomic  policy  ends;  however,  adjusting  VAT 
rates would not seem to be a particularly flexi-
ble instrument for managing demand. 
Leaving  aside  a  general  modification  of the 
level of rates, any change in them requires fairly 
considerable  technical  preparations.  Further-
more,. an increase in the number of rates entails 
an increase in  the  cost of running the system, 
both for taxable persons and for the tax author-
ities.  Finally, while increases in rates are gener-
ally  passed on in  full  in  prices, the same does 
not always  apply  to reductions in  rates  which 
frequently serve only to increase profit margins. 
This explains why, in recent years, the Member 
States have very  seldom used VAT as  a  short-
term economic policy instrument, although in-
creases  or reductions in rates,  introduced  per-
manently for primarily budgetary or social rea-
sons,  have  also  had  effe~ts on the  short-term 
situation. 
In  Denmark, the single VAT  rate was reduced 
from  15  o/o  to 9.25  o/o  between October 1975  and 
March  1976  in  order to stimulate consumption 
and so to boost production. 
In  France, the collection of tax was suspended 
in 1973 (zero rating) for retail sales of beef with 
the aim of curbing the rise in consumer prices. 
In both cases, the action, to be effective, had to 
be  fairly  radical  and  of sufficient  duration, 
which  caused  considerable  cash  deficits.  The 
effects  sought  were  not  fully  achieved:  in 
France, the abolition of tax charge in  1973  was 
not fully passed on to consumer prices, while in 
Denmark in  1976  there  were  such  perverse ef-
fects as an increase in imports. 
However, it should not be forgotten that the use 
of VAT for short-term economic purposes is not 
necessarily limited to adjustment of the rates. It 
can also take other forms, for example the limi-
tation  of the  right  to  deduct  input tax  in  the 
case of investments. 
Excise duties 
General analysis of  the excise duties to be 
harmonized 
32.  In all  Member States a significant propor-
tion of tax revenues is  derived from  excise du-
ties. However, dependence on the excises varies 
considerably, from  Jess  than 5 o/o  in  the Nether-
lands to almost 24 o/o  in  Ireland of total receipts 
of taxes and social contributions in 1977. 
Expressed  as  a  percentage  of  final  national 
consumption  in  1977,  the  receipts  of the  five 
major excises were as indicated in Table 4. 
Table 4- Receipts of  the five major excise duties (1977) 
B  D  DK  F  .  IRL  I  L  NL  UK 
Mineral oils  1.9  2.1  1.3  2.0  3.2  3.6  2.2  1.5  2.1 
Tobacco  0.8  1.1  1.7  0.4  2.0  1.0  1.3  0.7  2.0 
Spirits  .  0.3  0.4  0.7  0.4  1.5  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.7 
Beer  0.2  0.1  0.8  0.02  2.2  0.05  0.2  0.1  0.8 
Wine  0.1  0.05  0;2  0.03  0.1  - 0.1  0.08  0.2 
Total  3.2  3.8  4.8  2.8  8.9  4.8  4.1  2.9  5.8 
s.  1/80  27 With the exception of the partially harmonized 
excise on tobacco and some excises in  Ireland 
and  Denmark  (mostly  minor)  the  excises  are 
specific taxes- that is, their yield is a function 
of the  specific  rate  (a  monetary amount) and 
the  quantity  put  to  taxable  use.  Only  an  in-
crease  in  rates  or an  increase in  consumption 
can give a higher tax revenue. If a State wishes 
to raise  revenue from  a  certain  excise to  keep 
pace with  a  generally growing price level,  it  is 
necessary to adapt from time to time the rate of 
the excise concerned. (See Graphs 6 to II). 
By  contrast, the yield of an  ad valorem  excise 
follows  automatically  every  increase  in  the 
price of the product subject to the excise.  Ad-
justment of the rate will only become necessary, 
therefore, if the rise in the price of the product 
diverges significantly from the movement of the 
general price level, or if the State wishes to ad-
-just the tax burden on the product concerned. 
33.  In  1977,  the  yield  of the excises  on  min-
eral  oil,  tobacco,  spirits,  wine  and  beer  ac-
counted, in all  Member States except Denmark, 
for  an  overwhelming  proportion  of the  total 
yield  from  excise taxes.  In  Denmark, where  a 
range of other excises apply (and in  particular 
an excise at very high rates on the purchase of 
cars) other excises accounted for almost 40% of 
the  total.  In  the  other  eight  Member  States, 
however, excises other than the 'big five' never 
accounted for  more  than  I  0% of the total  ex-
ci~e- yield, and in several instances for less than 
5%. 
These five  excises of course apply at different 
rates in the different Member States - and the 
wine  excise  is  not  universally  applied.1  Nev-
ertheless, these excises,  notwithstanding varia-
tions  in  level,  are  in  general  applied  at rela-
tively high  rates. Their incidence, expressed as 
a  percentage of retail  price, is  frequently 60% 
or more.  Moreover,  the  goods  to  which  these 
five  excises apply are not rare or luxury items, 
but the  produce of major sectors of the  Com-
munity economy,  both  industrial  and  agricul-
tural.  In  addition,  expenditure  on  the  goods 
subject to  these excises account for a  substan-
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tial  proportion  of total  consumer expenditure 
- up to a  fifth.  Finally, it  should be  remem-
bered that alcohol and oil in particular are used 
throughout  the  Community  as  raw  materials, 
and often under tax  control; administration of 
these excises therefore impinges on a wide var-
iety of industries whose final  products are not 
subject to excises. 
The  combination  of generally  high  incidence 
and wide economic impact is  a  unique feature 
of the five  major-excises. At lower levels of tax, 
small differences in tax structure- such as dif-
ferences  in  exemptions,  or  in  the  period  al-
lowed  for  duty  deferment - although distor-
tions  of competition, may  not  assume serious 
proportions.  But  where the excise accounts for 
so large a part of final  price, differences in ex-
cise structure or in  administration which are at 
first  sight  minor  can  in  fact  markedly  distort 
competition, to the point at which a given mar-
ket can be made virtually inaccessible. 
34.  Four of these excises are wholly specific. 
The fifth  - the tobacco excise - which is  al-
ready partly harmonized - is specific in part. It 
follows, as  stated above, that to maintain their 
incidence  during  a  period  of rising  prices  re-
quires periodic increases in  the tax rate. Table 5 
shows  - as  an  index  - to  what  degree  the 
Member  States  have  adapted the  rates  of the 
excise duties on the products mentioned above 
since 1973. (The level of rates at I January 1973 
=  I  00  except  for  cigarettes,  which  at  I July 
1973  =  I  00, the date of entry into force of the 
first  Directive  on  harmonizing  of taxes  other 
than VAT on manufactured tobacco.) For com-
parison, the evolution of the index of consumer 
prices  in  general  during  the  same  period  is 
shown at the bottom of the table. 
This bottom line of course gives only· an overall 
view  of price  changes  during  the  period:  the 
price of a particular product may well  have di-
verged significantly from the overall figure. (Pet-
rol is  an obvious example.) Nevertheless, given 
1  Point40. 
s. 1/80 Table 5- Indices of  the evolution of  excise d~ty  on cigarettes, spirits, wine, beer and 
mineral oils 
8  DK  D  F  !RL  [  L  NL  UK 
All excise duty rates at I.  I. 1973  --
(tobacco at I. 7.  1973) = 100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
20 cigarettes at I. 7.  1979  225  211  126  131  185  186  168  153  177  - - -
Spirits at I. 7.  1979  139  188  130  186  202  167  100  132  144 
Wine at I. 7. 1979  200  187  - 100  242  - 100  191  218  - -
Beer at I. 7.  1979  137  143  100  100  233  ISO  147  100  151 
Standard petrol at I. 7.  1979  120  221  100  219  210  296  106  114  164  - - -
High-grade petrol at I. 7. 1979  120  221  100  222  210  204  106  114  164 
- -
Gas oil at I. 7.  1979  110  I  100  211  100  58  126  110  186  -
Consumer price index 
at July 1979  169  196  137  192  244  263  158  !58  256 
(Jan. 1973 = 100) 
'  DK introduced an excise duty 3.  10.  1977. The rate on I. 7.  1979 was 30 DKR/hl. 
Those instances in which the  increase in rates has exceeded the increase in the consumer price index are underlined. 
the very high tax content of most excise goods, 
the table offers an adequate basis for a general 
analysis. 
With unchanged policies, government expendi-
ture  could  be  expected to  rise  broadly in  line 
with the rise in  prices overall. (In practice, the 
trend for government expenditure to rise  more 
quickly than prices - i.e. to increase as  a  pro-
portion of GNP- is  almost universally main-
tained.)  Consequently,  governments  could  be 
expected to increase excise rates at least in line 
with  inflation.  Moreover,  such  a  policy, justi-
fied on fiscal grounds, is reinforced, in relation 
to cigarettes and alcoholic drinks, by the social 
and  health  policy  considerations  which  are 
claimed to  underlie these  excises  and, in  rela-
tion  to  minera((iTfs, -by-powerfta  conservation 
considerations. 
All  these factors in  combination would suggest 
th.at, over the medium term, the index for each 
s.  1/80 
excise should at least match or even surpass the 
consumer price index (except in the rare case of 
an unusually large and rapid increase in tax-ex-
clusive  price,  leading to  a  slump in  consump-
tion and tax receipts). 
As  can be seen from  Table 5,  most of Member 
States have changed all the excise duty rates for 
the  five  products  since  1973  - in  particular, 
those Member States with the highest inflation 
rates.  However, it  is  striking that, of the exam-
ples given in the table, only in  II instances did 
the increase in the excise rate match or exceed 
the increase in  prices overall.  In addition, cer-
tain  Member States,  for  certain  products,  left 
the excise rate  unchanged throughout the per-
iod.  Finally,  in  every  Member State,  such  in-
creases  in  rates  as  have  taken  place  have  fol-
lowed no discernible pattern. 
35.  Taking each excise in turn: 
Cigarettes: In ·three  Member States, rates  were 
increased by  more than the consumer price in-
29 dex;  in  the  remainder,  the  tax  increases  were 
less than the price index. 
Spirits:  In  all  nine  Member  States,  rates  in-
creased by less than the consumer price index. 
In  Luxembourg,  notwithstanding  a  general 
price increase of almost 60 %,  the rate was  un-
changed. 
Wine:  In  two  Member  States,  rates  were  in-
creased by considerably more than the increase 
in  the price index: in the remainder, the tax in-
creases  were  less  than the  price  index.  France 
and Luxembourg made no change in the rate. 
Beer: In  all  nine Member States, rates were in-
creased by less than consumer price index. Tlie 
Federal  Republic of Germany, France and the 
Netherlands made no change in the rate. 
Standard petrol: In three Member States, rates 
were increased by more than the increase in the 
consumer price index; in  the remainder, the tax 
increases  were  less  than  the  price  index.  The 
Federal Republic of Germany made no change. 
High-grade petrol: In  two Member States, rates 
were  increased  by  more  than· the  consumer 
price index; in  the remainder, the tax increases 
were less than the price index. The Federal Re-
public of Germany made no change. 
Gas oil: In all  Member States but one, the tax 
increases  were  less  than  the  price  index.  The 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Ireland 
made no change. 
36.  Graphs 6 to  II  below show greater detail 
how the excise duty rates in  EUA for the  pro-
ducts  as  mentioned  in  Table  5,  have evolved 
over time. The graphs show that within each of 
the  five  product  groups  wide  gaps  exist  be-
tween the duty rates from one Member State to 
the other. Whether or not the evolution of rates 
in the individual Member States since 1973  has 
contributed to narrowing that gap and approxi-
mating the  burden  on  each  product in  all  the 
Member States is not directly apparent from the 
graphs. 
37.  Table 6 illuminates this point, by convert-
ing the excise rates  into EUA (EUA values  at 
2 July  1979).  The average duty for all  Member 
States then  being calculated on this basis  and 
taken as  100, the table shows for each Member 
State the  percentage of the excise duty in  rela-
tion  to the average.  The last  column indicates 
the  standard  deviation.  Only  for  petroleum 
products do the standard deviations show a de-
crease.  By  contrast, for other excises, the stan-
dard deviation has markedly increased in every 
case. This result is  broadly consistent with  the 
data in  Table 5,  which shows the widely diver-
gent policies of the Member States on the ex-
cise rates over the same period. 
Table 6- Excise duty applicable in each Member State as a percentage of  the 
Community average 
average: EUA  - 100  B  OK  D  F  IRL  I  L  NL  UK  Stand. 
deviatlon 
Cigarettes 20 at I. 7.  1973  0.383  =  100  67  247  165  57  71  54  57  89  92  64.96 
at I. 7.  1979  0.674 =  100  86  299  118  42  74  57  54  77  92  78.04 
Spirits at I. 1.  1973  754 =  100  72  250  79  78  118  17  56  76  154  67.87 
at I. 7.  1979  1225  =  100  62  289  63  89  147  18  34  62  136  82.68 
Wine at 1.  I. 1973  21.45  =  100  69  257  0  7  181  0  69  73  243  101.83 
at 1. 7.  1979  43.03  =  100  69  240  0  4  218  0  34  69  265  109.68 
Beer at I. I. 1973  12.43  =  100  53  301  46  11  196  35  35  73  150  9~.40 
at I. 7. 1979  19.61  =  100  46  272  29  7  289  34  33  46  144  109.32 
Petrol  HG  at  I.  I.  1973  11.95  =  100  131  95  146  91  57  76  Ill  127  66  30.85 
at I. 7.  1979  18.96  =  100  99  132  92  127  76  140  74  91  68  26.87 
Gas oil at I. I. 1973  6.15  =  100  103  0  268  98  95  61  46  99  129  73.77 
at I. 7.  1979  8.14  =  100  85  51  203  156  72  27  44  82  180  63.58 
30  . s.  1/80 Mineral oils 
38:  All  the Member States levy  an excise on 
mineral oils. In all  cases, the burden of this ex-
cise  is  overwhelmingly  concentrated on motor 
fuels. These account for between 25% and 35 % 
of consumption of mineral oils in the different 
Member States,  whilst  yielding  between  80% 
and 95% of the excise revenue. With the excep-
tion of Italy, the level of the excise imposed on 
petrol, the most important motor fuel, varies re-
latively little. By contrast, as Table 7 shows, the 
excise levied on diesel  oil  varies considerably, 
between a tax slightly exceeding that on petrol 
in the United Kingdom to complete exemption 
for  most  motor lorries  in  Denmark  (although 
these vehicles are liable to an equalization tax). 
The  major divergences  betweeen  the  Member 
States in  applying this excise lie  in the exemp-
tions from  its  scope and the reduced rates ap-
plied to specific uses: In France1  exemption is 
granted for all  heavy fuel  oil  used in industry. 
In  all  other  Member  States,  heating  oils  (in-
cluding heavy fuel oils) are subject to a low rate 
(see Table 7).  In the United Kingdom, however, 
there is an exception to this rule, whereby min-
eral  oils  used to  produce energy for  industries 
linked to the  mineral  oil  industry, may be ex-
empted where  more than 50% of the  oil  con-
sumption in a given plant serves the production 
of mineral  oils.  In  Denmark, the  Netherlands 
and  France,  there  is  full  exemption  for  lubri-
cants, whereas in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, these are taxed at the full rate. 
These  variations  in  exemptions  give  rise  to 
wide-ranging distortions in competition, parti-
cularly  between  industries  which  are  heavily 
dependent on mineral oils as an energy source. 
Alcohol 
39.  Alcohol  is  subject to  an excise  in  all  the 
Member States. In general, the excise falls only 
on alcohol  (i.e.  ethyl  alcohol) for  human con-
sumption. Six of the nine Member States have a 
unique rate on all  potable spirits, irrespective of 
the raw  material  used,  the  method of produc-
tion, the size of the production unit, manner of 
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consumption etc. As Table 8 shows, three coun-
tries  distinguish  certain  potable  spirits  from 
others  (e.g.  alcohol  produced  from  wine  and 
other alcohols) and apply different tax rates to 
the  categories  thus  created.  These  differentia-
tions in  tax rates are usually justified on social 
or health grounds. It is,  however,  striking that 
they generally result in preferential treatment of 
domestic production. 
There are moreover very substantial differences 
between the levels of the excise rates levied on 
potable spirits, the highest rate in the Commu-
nity  (in  Denmark)  being  roughly  forty  times 
higher than the lowest (in Italy). 
The  use  of alcohol  for  industrial  purposes -
other than for pharmaceutical, medical or cos-
metic  purposes  - is  almost  invariably  ex-
empted from  the  excise  in  all  Member States. 
However, there are  a  wide range of minor ex-
emptions  which  vary  considerably  from  one 
Member State to another (e.g. patients in hospi-
tals are  permitted tax-free consumption in the 
UK;  alcohol  used  in  the  production  of other 
products, such as pastry, is  exempt in Italy). In 
some Member States, the use of alcohol for the 
production of cosmetics is  exempted whilst in 
other countries only a  reduced rate is  granted. 
In addition, most of the Member States which 
tax such use (usually at a reduced rate) also tax 
substitute alcohols at the same rate (e.g. isopro-
pyl  alcohol). Some intermediate alcoholic bev-
erages (e.g. liqueur wines) are in some Member 
States  subject to the alcohol  excise  while they 
are subject to the wine excise in others. 
Wine 
40.  Italy does not apply an excise to wine; the 
Federal  German excise  applies only to spark-
ling wine, and in  the  Benelux countries, wine 
originating  in  Luxembourg  is  either  exempt 
from  the excise (Luxembourg) or is  taxed at a 
1  11  should be noted that VAT taxpayers are not permitted in 
France to deduct VAT paid on purchases of mineral oils other 
than heavy fuel oils.  This has  the effect of an additional ex-
cise on the products affected.  However. for commercial road 
vehicles. the amount of non-deductible VAT is  taken into ac-
count in fixing the level of the axle tax ("taxe a l"essieu"). 
31 reduced  rate  (Belgium,  the  Netherlands).  The 
wine  excise  is  therefore  unique  amongst  the 
five  major excises proposed for harmonization, 
in  that  it  is  not  in  general  application  in  all 
Member States. 
This  fundamental  divergence  between  the 
Member States  is  accentuated by  the fact  that 
the wine-importing countries levy the wine ex-
cise  at relatively high  levels.  The range  in  tax 
rates  for  a  still  table  wine  of II o  is  therefore 
from zero to 116  EUA per hi. (see Table 9). 
The scope of the wine excise also varies consi-
derably. Certain Member States extend the ex-
cise  to  include  fortified  wines  (such  as  sherry 
and port, aromatized wines, and liqueur wines). 
The  rates  applied  to  these  wines  are  in  some 
instances  roughly  proportional  to  their  al-
coholic  strengths.  In  other instances, different 
rates are applied to wines falling within different 
bands of alcoholic strength; the differences be-
tween the rates may or may not be proportional 
to  the  differences between the bands.  By  con-
trast,  other  Member  States  classify  certain 
wines as alcohols, and subject them - usually 
with  some  reduction  in  rate - to the  alcohol 
excise. 
Beer 
41.  Beer  is  subject  to  an  excise  in  all  the 
Member  States.  There  are  three  major differ-
ences between the beer excises.  First, six of the 
Member States tax  beer at  the  pre-production 
stage, that is, on the worts, which is an interme-
diate product between the initial mashing of the 
raw  materials  and the  finished  products.  Sev-
eral of these Member States grant to domestic 
producers  arbitrary  loss  allowances,  to  cover 
losses between the production of the worts and 
delivery of the finished beer. All Member States 
applying the worts system are obliged to make 
arbitrary corrections in calculating the duty on 
imported beers. 
Three Member States (France, the -Federal  Re-
public of Germany and Denmark) apply the ex-
cise to the finished product. This is  the system 
favoured  by  the  Commission  in  its  1972  pro-
32 
posal,  because  it  offers  the  best  means  for 
achieving tax neutrality in international trade. 
Secondly, there are large variations in the levels 
of the  beer excises  (see  Table II).  In  general, 
these variations reflect  differences in  the  level 
of taxation of alcoholic drinks overall. (For ex-
ample, Italy has relatively very  low  excises  on 
beer and alcohol and no excise on table wine. 
Denmark's excises  on  wine,  beer and  alcohol 
are  in  each  case  amongst  the  highest  in  the 
Community.) 
Thirdly, certain  Member States apply progres-
sive  rates  to  domestic  producers,  which  vary 
with the total annual volume of beer produced. 
Where  such  systems  apply  only  to  domestic 
producers, they clearly discriminate against im--
ports (although steps have been, or are  being, 
taken, to correct this).  Even when  Article 95  of 
the Treaty is  respected, however, the  Commis-
sion  regards such  measures  as  distorting com-
petition  between  production  units  of differing 
size. The Commission's proposals envisage the 
eventual abolition of such provisions. 
Manufactured tobaccos 
42.  Cigarettes yield roughly 90% of the tax re-
ceipts from  tobacco.  In  order to improve com-
petition  and  interpenetration  of  markets,  a 
phased harmonization of  the excise on all manu-
factured  tobaccos  began  in  1973.  The  first 
stage - which applied only to cigarettes - was 
replaced by a second stage in  1978. This in turn 
is  due to be replaced by a third stage in  1981. 
Common  definitions  for  all  manufactured 
tobaccos were adopted in 1978. 
The Community system chosen for cigarettes is 
part-specific  (a  fixed  sum  per  cigarette)  and 
part-ad  valorem  (a  percentage  of retail  price). 
This system  is  in  large  measure a  compromise 
between  the  two  extremes  of wholly  specific 
and wholly ad valorem systems  which  applied 
in  the  original  six  Member States.  At  present, 
the specific element may vary between 5 % and 
.55% of the  total  tax  burden  (including  VAT) 
levied  on  the  most  popular  price  category. 
Table I  0 shows where the Member States place 
s. 1180 themselves  within this permitted range.  At the 
final  stage, a single ratio must be fixed for the 
specific element. 
Progress in  harmonizing the cigarette excise has 
been slow and difficult.  This is  largely  due to 
the fact that the cigarette markets of the Mem-
ber  States  differ  in  many  important  respects. 
On some markets, the retail price range is  rela-
tively narrow (e. g.  Denmark about 15% of the 
lowest  price  category);  on  others,  strikingly 
large (e. g.  in France, about 140% of the lowest 
price category). In addition, there are consider-
able differences in consumer tastes, in  packag-
ing,  in  the constraints on advertising, in  price 
controls  and so  on.  Finally,  the  objectives  of 
private  sector and  State-owned· producers  fre-
quently conflict. 
By  contrast, the tax burden on cigarettes varies 
within  relatively  narrow limits.  In  eight of the 
nine Member States, the tax burden (excise plus 
VAn falls  between 61  %  and 73  %  of the retail 
price.  Denmark is  a  marked  exception to  this 
rule, with a tax burden approaching 90 % - a 
figure which reflects the generally high level of 
all the Danish excises (see Graph 5). 
There  are,  however,  considerable  differences 
both in the levels of the excise levied on other 
manufactured tobaccos, the most important of 
which are cigars and smoking tobaccos, and the 
way (specific ad valorem or mixed) in which the 
rates  are  expressed.  For cigars, the tax burden 
(excise  plus  VAn  varies  between  13  o/o  ~nd 
65 % of the retail price and for smoking tobac-
cos, between 30% and 75% of the retail  price. 
The major source of differences here lies in the 
fact that some Member States tax all  manufac-
tured tobaccos at broadly the same level, whilst 
others  apply  much  reduced  rates  to  smoking 
tobacco and cigars. 
Table 7- Excise duty rates on mineral oils in application at I. II. I979 in the 
Member States of  the Community 
(per hlin EUA) 
Product  8  D  DK  F  GB  IRL  I  L  NL 
Standard petrol  21.14  17.73  24.83  22.84  12.22  14.27  25.71  14.12  17.41 
,. 
High-grade petrol  21.14  17.73  24.83  24.33  12.22  14.27  26.43  14.12  17.41 
Diesel oil  7.00  16.70  4.09  12.84  13.88  5.83  2.18  3.62  6.69 
Gas oil for heating  1.12  0.67  4.09  2.38  1.00  0.66  1.61'  0.62-0.95  1.18 
Heavy fuel oil  0.24  0.58  4.45  0  1.00  0.66  0.08  0.24  0.49 
Lubricants  0.22  17.94  0  0  1.00  0.66  11.76- 12.31  0.22  0 
I EUA at I.  II. 1979 40.0146  2.48215  7.33073  5.80591  0.663027  0.668985  1144.47  40.0146  2.75763 
BFR  DM  DKR  FF  UKL  IRL  LIT  LFR  HFL 
s.  1180  33 ~  Table 8 - Comparative table of  the excise duty on spirits 
(in EUA per hl of pure alcohol- Reference date: 3. 9.  1979) 
Y' 
"  00 
0 
I. SPIRITS 
- Alcohol distilled from 
vinicultural products 
- Alcohol distilled from 
fruits 
- Alcohol distilled from 
other products 
- Brandies from grains 
(whisky, gin) 
- Brandies from fruits 
- Brandies from wine 
- Aquavit· 
-Rum 
- Genever gin 
- Liqueurs 
- Spiced wines 
- Liqueur wines with cer-
tified denomination of 
origin  -








770.75  9 





770.75  2 
770.75  2 
770.75  2 
B  DK  F  IRL 
752.13  3524.21  303.38/  1783.44  I 
1081.33 
752.13  3524.21  1081.33  1783.44 
752.13  3524.21  1081.33  1783.44 
752.13  .3524.21  1081.33  1776.27  I 
752.13  3524.21  1081.33  1776.27 
752.13  3524.21  723.71  1776.27 
752.13  2295.57  1081.33  1776.27 
752.13  3524.21  525.41  1776.27 
752.13  3524.21  844.05  1776.27 
752.13  3524.21  723.71  1776.27  4 
see wine  191.18/hl  844.05  only wine 
duty3  duty 
see wine  191.18/hl .  723.71  only wine 
duty3  duty 
see wine  191.18/hl  884.05  only wine 
duty3  duty 
I  L  NL  UK 
97.16  9  419.22  756.74  1700.52 
I  05.99-141.33  419.22  756.74  1700.52 
176.66-220.82  419.22  756.74  1700.52 
220.82  419.22  756.74  1695.35 
105.99  419.22  9  756.74  .  1695.35 
.93.63  419.22  9  756.74  1695.35 
220.82  419.22  756.74  1695.35 
176.66  419.22  756.74  1695.35 
220.82  419.22  756.74  1695.35 
220.82  419.22  756.74  1695.35 
146.63or  see wine  see wine  only wine 
220.82  ~  duty3  duty3  duty 
146.63or  see wine  see wme  only wine 
220.82  ~  duty3  duty3  duty 
220.82  see wine  see wine  only wine 
duty3  duty3  duty ~ 
"  00 
0 
~ 
- Alcohol for medical or  474.31  752 .  .13  exempt  35.59  exempt  220.82  419.22 
pharmaceutical use, not 
denatured 
- Alcohol content of: 
- pharmac. prod. for  237.16  752.13  exempt  35.59  exempt  0.88-220.82  419.22 
external use 
..,. parfumes and cos met- 237.16  246.60  exempt  8  92.37  7  1783.44  4  220.82  226.87 
ics, not denatured 
.:.. parfumes and cosmet- 237.16  246.60  exempt  8  92.37  exempt  0.88  226.87 
ics, denatured  10.60 
- Alcohol for other indus- exempt  exempt  exempt  exempt  exempt  0.88-10.60  exempt 
trial uses, denatured 
- Alcohol for vinegar  19.76  exempt  exempt  exempt  exempt  -8  exempt 
- Methylated alcohol,  - exempt or  - - 7  - 1.77  exempt or 
propyl and isopropyl  246.60  226.87 
alcohol 
DM  BFR  DKR  FF  IRL  LIT  LFR 
I EUA corresponds at  2.52999  40.5517  7.29667  5.90013  0.672886  1132.13  40.5517 
3.9.1979 
I  The higher rate applies if the product has not been warehoused three years or more. 
'  The excise duty on spirits is levied on the alcohol exceeding 14 o/o by vol. for liqueur wines and on the alcohol exceeding 10.5  o/o by vol.  for spiced wines. 
3  Spiced wines and liqueur wines are subject to the excise duty on spirits for the alcohol added. in addition to the excise duty on wine. 
"  Importers can avoid testing of the imported goods when paying the rate provided for this case. 
s  The lower rate applies on vermouth and Marsala. 
•  It is not permitted to produce vinegar with alcohol and vinegar acid. 
1  Methylated spirit and propyl and isopropyl alcohol are treated as ethyle alcohol, but can not be used for beverages or medical purposes. 
II  Certain perfumes and cosmetics are subject to a special excise duty. 
9  Certain distillers are granted reduced rates of duty. 
756.74  exempt 
756.74  exempt 
247.92  1700.52 
247.92  exempt 
exempt  exempt 
exempt  exempt 
exempt  -
HFL  UKL 





(in EUA per hi-Reference date: 3. 9. 1979) 
0  8  OK  F 
II. WINE 
A.  Still wines 
- strength .;;  10° 
G.L. 
- of fresh grapes  - 14.80-29.59  102.79  1.53 
- of fruits  - 29.59  66.47  as spirits 
where ap-
prop. 
- strength .;;  12° 
- of fresh grapes  14.80-29.59  102.79  1.53 
- of fruits  - 29.59  66.47  as spirits 
whereap-
prop. 
- strength .;;  15° 
- of fresh grapes  - 29.59+0.26  102.79  1.53 
per 1110° 
above 12° 
- of fruits  - 29.59+0.26  66.47-105.53  as spirits 
per 1110°  whereap-
above 12°  prop. 
- strength >  15° 
- of fresh grapes  - 29.59+0.42  191.18  1.53-3.811 
per IIIOo 
above 12° 
- of fruits  - 29.59+0.42  105.53-191.18  as spirits 
per 1110°  whereap-
above 12°  prop. 
IRL  I  L  NL  UK 
92.97  - 0. 14.80  14.91-29.82  116.14 
80.62  - 14.80  29.82  75.46 
92.97  - 0- 14.80  14.91-29.82  116.14 
80.62  - 14.80  29.82  112.99 
92.97/120.99  - 14.80+0.26  29.82+0.27  116.14 
per 1110°  per 1/10° 
above 12°  above 12° 
80.62/100.72  14.80+0.26  29.82+0.27  112.99 
per 1/10°  per 1110° 
above 12°  above 12° 
120.99/  - 14.80+0.42  29.82-0.43  134.02-157.80 
149.40  per 1/10°  per 1110°  +  16.91  per
0 
above 12°  above 12°  above2r 
G.L. 
100.72/  - 14.80+0.42  29.82-0.43  124.19+ 
110.90  per 1110°  per 1/10°  16.91 pero 
above 1r  above 12°  above 18° 





B. Sparkling wines 
- strength ,..  6° 
- of fresh grapes  79.05  33.29  191.18 
- of fruits  79.05  33.29  191.18 
- strength > 6° 
- of fresh grapes  79.05  88.78-103.57  191.18 
- of fruits  79.05  48.09  191.18 
- with certified  79.05  103.57  191.18 
denomination 
'Champagne' 
DM  BFR  DKR 
I EUA corresponds at  2.52999  40.5517  7.29667 
3.9.1979 
-
'  Applies only on natural sweet wines subject to the excise duty on wine. 
!.53  182.68  - 3.70  33.55  141.69 
as spirits  140.28  - 3.70  33.55  87.26 
1.53  182.68  - 36.99-51.79  89.42-104.37  141.69-159.57 
as spirits  140.28  - 48.09  48.46  87.26-135.99 
3.81  182.68  - 51.79  104.37  141.69 
FF  IRL  LIT  LFR  HFL  UKL 
5.90013  0.672886  1132.13  40.5517  2.77506  0.61565 
- -- - ·-Table 10  - 'Popular' cigarettes (20 pack): Price and Tax Structures 




Country  VAT 
National  Spec.  Ad. val.  Total excise 
EUA  (per I 000  (%retail  % 
currency  cigarettes)  price)  % 
Belgium  41  BFR/25 = 
32.80 BFR/20  0.827  59 BFR  62.05  65.65  5.66 
Luxembourg  30 LFR/25 = 
24 LFR/20  0.605  48 LFR  55.55  59.55  2.00 
Netherlands  2.60 HFR/25 = 
2.08  HFL/20  0.767  3.60 HFL  51.07  54.53  14.70 
France  2.50 FF  0.435  4.54 FF  43.60  47.20  25.45 
FR of Germany  2.85 OM  1.136  49.2 OM  24.3  58.80  II.SO 
Italy  600 LIT  0.529  518 LIT  56.2  57.93  15.25 
Denmark  16.50 OKR  2.364  401.1  OKR  23.04  71.65  16.84 
UK  0.66 UKL  0.975  11.74 UKL  21  56.51  13.04 
Ireland  0.54 IRL  0.797  9.11RL  20.2  53.88  9.09 
Table 11 - Comparative table of  the excise duty on beer 
(in EUA- Reference date: 3: 9.  1979) 
Product  0  B  OK  F  IRL  I 
4°9 Balling  2.37-2.96  6.24  0/5.41  0.76  21.33  2.60 
7° 3  5 Balling  3.56-4.45  6.24  0/42.42  0.76  31.43  3.90 
11°  Balling  4.74-5.93  8.91  52.98  0.76  47.14  5.83 
12° 5 Balling  4.74-5.93  8.91  52.98  1.36 1  53.87  6.62 
13°75 Balling  4.74-5.93  10.69  62.88  1.36 1  61.73  7.29 
16°  Balling  7.11 -8.89  12.30  62.88  1.361  69.58  8.48 
IEUA 
corresponds at  OM  BFR  DKR  FF  IRL  LIT 
3.9.1979to  2.52999  40.5517  7.29667  5.90013  0.672886  1132.13 






Total taxes  of total tax 
burden 
%  EUA 
% 
71.31  0.590  5.04 
61.55  0.372  6.5 
69.23  0.531  5.0 
72.65  0.316  5.0 
70.30  0.800  49.2 
73.18  0.387  2.36 
88.49  2.078  54.99 
69.61  0.678  51.0 
62.97  0.502  53.5 
(per hi) 
L  NL  UK 
4.53  6.45  17.30 
4.53  6.45  17.30 
6.48  9.04  24.20 
6.48  9.04  27.65 
7.77  10.94  31.67 
8.94  12.54  35.70 
LFR  HFL  UKL 
40.5517  2.77506  0.61565 
s. 1/80 :n  Graph 5  - Retail price (VAT and excise duty) in  EUA I per 20 cigarettes 
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Graph 7 - Evolution in E U  A I of  the excise duty on 100 %pure afcohol 
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Graph II  - Evolution in  EVA I of  the excise duty on gas oil 
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73  76  79 Corporation tax 
43.  Analysis  of the  corporation  taxes  at  pre-
sent in  force in the Member States reveals sub-
stantial differences in  each of the elements re-
garded  as  essential  in  taxes  on  profits:  the 
scope of the  tax,  1  the system, the rates of tax, 
the  normal  basis of assessment and incentive 
measures. In addition, a look at the development 
of  corporation taxes in Member States over recent 
years  shows  that  they  are  subject  to the  same 
process  as  taxes  in  general,  i.e.  they  are  fre-
quently modified so as to meet requirements in 
the budgetary, economic and social field. 
System and  rates 
44.  The  main  change  in  corporation tax  sys-
tems during recent years has been the transition 
in  several  Member States to  the so-called  tax 
credit  system  of taxation.  Under this  system, 
part  or all  of the  corporation  tax  charged  on 
distributed profits (dividends) is  imputed to the 
shareholder against his personal income tax lia-
bility on such dividends; the aim of the system 
is to alleviate or eliminate the economic double 
taxation of dividends.  Economic double taxa-
tion is a feature of the 'classical' system of taxa-
tion  because this  system  does  not  provide  for 
any link-up between taxation of the distributing 
company and taxation of the sharehold-er. 
At  present,  a  tax  credit  system  is  applied  in 
seven  Member  States.  Only  the  Netherlands 
and Luxembourg still apply the classic system. 
Most of the Member States have thus come to 
use a  corporation tax system of the type advo-
cated by the Commission in the proposal for a 
Directive  which  it  laid  before  the  Council  in 
1975. 2 This marks substantial progress along the 
lines of the Commission's proposal, but there is 
none the less a long way to go before achieving 
a harmonized system. 
Major differences do in fact still exist, particu-
larly as regards the two elements which play a 
key  role  in  the degree  to which  the economic 
46 
double  taxation  of  dividends  is  mitigated, 
namely  the  rates  of corporation  tax  and  the 
rates  of the tax  credit to  be granted to  share-
holders. The differences in the rates of the tax 
credit are  particularly conspicuous. The  Com-
mission's  proposal  provides  that  these  rates 
should lie within a range of 45% to 55 % of the 
amount of corporation tax (partial  imputation 
system).  However, the rates applied in  the rel-
evant Member States at present vary from  I  00% 
of the tax charged on distributed profits in the 
Federal  Republic  of Germany  (which  means 
that there is  full  imputation of the corporation 
tax charged on such profits) to about 15 %-25% 
of such tax in  other countries (in Denmark, the 
tax credit is equivalent to IS% of the amount of 
distributed  dividends).  The  other  Member 
States which have introduced the tax credit sys-
tem occupy an intermediate position. 
As  regards the rates of the tax itself, the differ-
ences  between  Member States are  clearly  less 
pronounced than in the case of the rates of the 
tax credit, but they are nevertheless not inconsi-
derable.  Here too, the rates  applied in  several 
Member States lie outside the range (again 45% 
to 55%) which the Commission envisaged in its 
proposal.  The  rates  of corporation  tax  vary 
from 56 % in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(for undistributed profits) to 37 % in  Denmark 
and 25 % in  Italy (in  Italy,  however,  corpora-
tion tax is  supplemented by a  local tax, called 
'IIor', amounting to  15%, to  be set off against 
the basis  of assessment of corporation tax, so 
that the actual overall rate is 36.25 %). 
Table 12  below  outlines  the  situation  (as  at 
31  December  1979)  regarding  the rates  of cor-
poration tax and of tax credit applying in  the 
Member States and the rates of the withholding 
taxes charged on distributed dividends. 
1  The problem of scope is examined in Chapter V, point 88. 
2  OJ  C 253 of 5.  II. 1975: Supplement 10/75- Bull. EC 
s.  1/80 Table 12- Corporation taxes 
Member State  Rate of corporation tax 
Belgium  48 %(profits in excess 
of BFR 15 000 000)1 
(special increase by way 
of 'solidarity' contribu-
tion) 
Denmark  37% 
Federal  56%:  undistributed 
Republic of  profits 
Germany  36 o/o:  distributed profits 
France  50  o/o 
Ireland  45  o/o  (profits in excess 
of 
IRL 35 000)1 
Italy  25 %:  corporation tax 
15 %:  'llor'2 (to be set 




Actual overall rate: 
36.25 o/o 
Luxembourg  40  o/o  (profits in excess 
ofLFR 
I 312 000)1 
(special increase by way 
of contribution to the 
unemployment fund) 
Netherlands  48 o/o  (profits in excess 
HFL50000) I 
United  52 o/o  (pro  fits in excess 
Kingdom  of 
UKL 100 000) I 
Lower rates apply to profits below this level. 
Jmposta locale sui redditi (local income tax). 
s. 1/80 
(Situation at31. 12.  /979) 
Rate of tax  credit  Withholding  tax  on  dividends 
a)  as% of the gross dividend  (subject  to  the  provisions  of 
b)  as% of corporation tax  double taxation  convent~ons) 
a)  46% of the dividend  20% 
b)  49.8% of the tax 
a)  15% of the dividend  30 o/o 
b)  approx. 25.5 %of 
the tax 
a)  91!6 of the dividend  25  o/o 
b)  I  00 o/o  of the tax on 
distributed profits 
a)  50% of the dividend  0 o/o (residents) 
b)  50 %of the tax  25  o/o (non-residents) 
a)  30ho of the dividend  No withholding tax 
b)  52.4% of the tax 
a)  331JJ of the dividend  10%  (residents) 
b)  I 00 o/o of corporation  30 o/o (non-residents) 
tax (58.6 o/o of the 
total of the two 
taxes) 
No tax credit  15 o/o (no withholding 
tax on dividends distri-
buted by Luxembourg 
holding companies) 
No tax credit  25  o/o 
a)  3f7 of the dividend  No withholding tax 
b)  39.6 o/o of the tax 
47 Normal basis of  assessment 
45.  As regards the basis of assessment for cor-
poration  tax,  Member  States'  tax  laws  apply 
broadly  the  same  principles  defining  taxable 
profits  and the  method  of determining  them; 
for  example,  all  the  national  tax  laws  contain 
provisions  relating  to  the  basic  elements  gov-
erning the  calculation  of taxable  profits,  such 
as  depreciation,  capital  gains  and  losses,  re-
serves  and  provisions,  the  carryover of losses 
.and the valuation of the other assets and liabili-
1ties. 
'However, as  soon as one gets  down to the  de-
tails  of national rules,  differences  immediately 
become apparent. These differences are so num-
erous  and  varied  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
provide a complete picture of them in the con-
text of this report; instead, a number of exam-
ples of major differences will  be cited for each 
of the elements making up the basis of assess-
ment. 
46.  As  far  as  normal  depreciation  is  con-
cerned (i.e. depreciation other than that serving 
as  an  incentive,  such  as  accelerated  deprecia-
tion),  there  are  differences  between  Member 
States in,  for  example, the definition of assets 
eligible for depreciation, the value to be depre-
ciated, the period of depreciation, the methods 
and percentages to be applied (e.g. straight-line 
or reducing-balance  depreciation)  to  different 
assets  and in  different situations, the  required 
link  between  depreciation  for  accounting  pur-
poses  and  depreciation  for  tax  purposes,  the 
compulsory  or  non-compulsory  nature  of de-
preciation for tax  purposes, the provisions ap-
plicable in the case of special depreciation, the 
possibility  of recovering  unused  depreciation 
etc. 
47.  Regarding the tax treatment of companies' 
capital  gains  and  losses,  examination  of the 
provisions in force in the Member States shows 
in  particular that, in some Member State, capi-
tal gains and losses are regarded as a particular 
form  of profits and are consequently subject to 
specific  taxation  arrangements  distinct  from 
those applicable to a company's normal profits, 
a system which results in  alleviation of the tax 
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burden.  In  other  Member States,  by  contrast, 
capital gains and losses are regarded as part of 
normal  profits,  though  this  does  not  prevent 
them  being subject to reduced taxation in  cer-
tain  cases (e.g.  in  the  event of the winding-up 
of a  company).  Other differences ·which  stand 
out in  this  area. relate  to the  chargeable event 
(taxation  either only in  the  event  of a  capital 
gain  being  realized,  or on  the  distribution  of 
capital gains  or  indeed on their mere  entry in 
the company accounts), exemptions, allowance 
for  the  effects  of inflation  in  determining  the 
taxable amount, the  distinction made between 
long-term  and  short-term  capital  gains,  the 
rules applicable in  the event of winding-up, the 
rules  applicable in  the event of mergers,  divi-
sions  or contributions of assets,  and the rules 
applicable in the event of the compulsory reali-
zation of assets (expropriation, etc.). 
48.  Major differences  are  also  evident in  the 
valuation of company assets and liabilities, par-
ticularly  the  valuation  of stocks.  In this  area, 
the key  question is  the extent to which the ef-
fects  of inflation are taken into account in  the 
valuation  of assets  and  liabilities  and,  conse-
quently,  in  the taxation  of firms.  Inflation af-
fects  company taxation because traditional ac-
counting practices (generally applied in the tax 
field),  which  are  based on historical  costs,  do 
not allow the effects of cost increases to be re-
flected  satisfactorily  in  calculating  profits.  In 
other words, the use of historical costs in calcu-
lating depreciation and the value of goods sold 
means  that  fictitious  profits  are  incorporated 
into  taxable  profits,  so  that taxation  eats  into 
the very substance of the firm. 
Though this problem has been widely discussed 
in  the academic and busipess world due to the 
high level of inflation over recent years, none of 
the  countries  has  yet  come  up  with  any  sys-
tematic and generalized solutions in the practical 
area  of  taxation.  However,  several  Member 
States  apply  rules,  notably  regarding  the  tax 
treatment of stocks, to offset the  unf~vourable 
effects of the fall  in the value of money. In this 
area too, however, the relevant provisions differ 
as  between  the  Member  States  concerned. 
Whereas  a  systematic stock revaluation  proce-
dure is  applied  in  France,  Ireland, the  United 
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many (though  here  again,  the  criteria  applied 
differ in  each of the  countries), other methods 
are used  in  other Member States,  for  example 
the  LIFO method of accounting (under which 
goods purchased most recently are assumed to 
be the goods removed first from stock), which is 
authorized in  the  Netherlands and, under cer-
tain conditions, in  Italy and Luxembourg, and 
the  base  stock  method  (valuation  of a  base 
stock at constant prices), which may be applied 
in the Netherlands. 
49.  Examination of national rules  concerned 
the creation of reserves and provisions and the· 
carryover of losses  shows  that,  in  these  areas, 
too, very  many differences exist. Regarding the 
rules on the carryover of losses, the major dif-
ferences relate to the  length of the period dur-
ing which  a  loss  in  one financial  year may  be 
offset  against  profits  earned  in  subsequent  or 
indeed preceding financial years.  As  far as the 
rules  on  tax-free  reserves  and  provisions  are 
concerned,  the  major  difference  is  that  some 
countries are more generous than others in  de-
termining the  situations in  which  the  creation 
of a reserve or provision is authorized. 
Incentives 
50.  The  use  of taxation  as  an  instrument of 
certain policies in the Member States has led to 
the  introduction  of special  incentives  in  the 
field of taxation of corporate profits. 
Originally,  such  incentives  were  introduced 
mainly in the economic policy area (short-term 
economic  policy,  regional  policy,  industrial 
policy) and were aimed at encouraging invest-
ment  by  firms  and the  establishment  of new 
firms. 
During recent  years,  however,  Member States 
have  also increasingly  used taxation in  imple-
menting other policies, such as those relating to 
environmental protection, energy, employment 
and  aid to  developing countries.  Under these 
policies, the encouragement of investment still 
plays a key role in  achieving the objectives pur-
sued,  but tax  concessions  are  sometimes  also 
granted on  the  basis of criteria  oth~r th;tn  tho.: 
amount of investment.  For example. in  an  o.:m-
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ployment policy context, the criterion used may 
. be the number of new jobs created, so as to in-
duce firms  to carry out job-creating investment 
rather  than  investment  intended  to  improve 
productivity. 
Tax incentives may cover the entire territory of 
a country, but they may also be restricted to cer-
tain  underdeveloped  regions,  certain  branches 
of activity (e.g.  shipbuilding or textiles) or in-
deed  to  certain  activities  within  firms  (e.g. 
scientific research and development and inno-
vation). 
The  Member  States,  like  a  number  of other 
countries, make intensive use ·of the tax instru-
ment.  The  number of incentives  is  tending to 
increase  and,  because  of political  desiderata, 
Member States have shown a fair degree of in-
genuity  in  developing  new  measures  of this 
type. In addition, incentives are very frequently 
modified  to  meet  current  requirements  (as  is 
natural,  since  they  are  a  policy  instr.ument). 
Thus,  some  incentives  are  periodically  sus-
pended, while others, initially introduced tern-. 
porarily, become permanent or vice versa, and 
other incentives introduced in a given sector or 
region are extended to other sectors or regions, 
or become general in their application. 
51.  The differences in  national tax provisions 
described earlier in  connection  with  the  basic 
arrangements also apply to the provisions gov-
erning incentives. Of course, some forms of in-
centive are in general use throughout the Com-
munity  (e.g.  accelerated  depreciation,  though 
the detailed rules always differ), but others are 
used only in some Member States or indeed in 
only one Member State. 
The following list gives examples of incentives 
which  are  in  force  in  some  Member States of 
the  Community (often on condition that addi-
tional requirements are fulfilled):  1 
(i)  accelerated  depreciation  (Belgium,  Federal 
Republic  of Germany,  France,  Ireland,  Italy 
and the United Kingdom). In the United King-
'  It  .;hould he pointed out that the extent to which provisions 
act as incentives sometimes depends on how they are applied. 
For example. accelerated depreciation may not amount to  an 
i ncenl i ve in  L  he case of some categories. of goods. 
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amounts to  100% during a single year forcer-
tain investments; 
(ii)  deduction from the basis of assessment of a 
specified percentage of investments, or of cer-
tain new investments, carried out by firms (Bel-
gium, Ireland and the United Kingdom); 
(iii)  tax  exemption  for  some  premiums  and 
subsidies  granted  by  the  State  under  certain 
policies  (Belgium,  Federal  Republic  of Ger-
many, France and Ireland); 
(iv)  exemption  of  all  or  part  of  the  profits 
earned by firms, or by new firms in the first few 
years  following  their  establishment,  provided· 
that the firms reinvest the profits, in some cases 
in  certain  underdeveloped  regions  (France, 
Italy and Luxembourg); 
(v)  unlimited  carryover  of losses  suffered  by 
new firms  during the  first  few  years  following 
their establishment (Belgium); 
. (vi)  tax exemption of company profits up to a 
specified amount of the dividends  distributed 
on new shares,  so  as  to encourage investment 
and saving (Belgium and France); 
(vii)  partial  or  full  exemption  for  corporate 
profits  deriving  from  exports  of goods  manu-
factured within the country (Ireland); 
(viii)  establishment of a  tax-free reserve  made 
up  of  a  speCified  percentage  of  the  profits 
earned  during  the  financial  year,  so  as  to  fi-
nance  future  investment  or  certain  future  in-
vestments  carried  out  by  the  firm  (Belgium, 
Denmark and France); 
(ix)  creation  of  reserves  temporarily  exempt 
from  tax and corresponding to a specified per-
centage of investment carried out in certain de-
veloping  countries  (Federal  Republic  of Ger-
many); 
(x)  reduction  in  the rate of tax  for  new  firms 
situated  in  certain  underdeveloped  regions 
(Italy); 
(xi)  reduction in the rate of tax on the profits of 
companies  which  have  increased  their  labour 
force by a specified percentage during a finan-
cial year (Ireland); 
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(xii)  reduction  of the  amount  of  tax  corres-
ponding to a  percentage of certain new invest-
ments (Luxembourg). 
In this context, attention should be drawn to a 
fundamental change to the system of incentives 
in  the  Netherlands.  Incentives  related  to  the 
basis of assessment were recently replaced by a 
system under which a fraction of the amount of 
new investment is  set off, in  the form  of basic 
premiums and additional premiums, against the 
amount of tax, with any excess being refunded 
by the State. This system was preferred because, 
unlike reductions in the basis of assessment, it 
allows firms  that do not earn sufficient profits 
or indeed incur losses,  to  benefit to  the same 
extent  as  other  firms  from  the  financial  aid 
granted by the  State.  It  was  also  felt  that this 
system was better suited to  selecting the objec-
tives to be pursued under certain policies. 
. Finally, this system, like subsidies, also has the 
advantage of being transparent and in  addition 
allows precise calculation of the budgetary cost 
of the  aids  granted.  Incentives  involving  the 
basis  of assessment  are,  by  contrast, generally 
opaque since the tax  relief which they provide 
depends on the level of profits and on the level 
of taxation.  It  is  therefore only after the event 
that firms can ascertain the exact amount of tax 
relief. For the same. reasons, the budgetary costs 
of the  reliefs  are  difficult  to  forecast  and are 
therefore  not  under full  budgetary  control  by 
parliament. 
Final remarks 
52.  As  stated in the introduction to this chap-
ter, this analysis does not cover the other taxes, 
often local  taxes,  to  which  firms  are  liable  in 
certain Member States, such as the business tax 
in  France, the tax on industry and trade in the 
Federal  Republic  of Germany  and  the  com-
mune trade tax in  Luxembourg.  In  1977,  these 
three taxes accounted for 2.6 %, 5.5% and 3.9% 
respectively of total receipts from  taxes and ac-
tual social contributions in these countries. 
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Difficulties and consequences of tax 
harmonization 
53.  This  chapter on the consequences of har-
monization highlights the main difficulties with 
which  Member  States  will  have  to  contend. 
Some of these difficulties  would appear to  be 
very  real;  others,  such  as  the  room  for  man-
oeuvre which  Member States must have in  or-
der  to  pursue  their  budgetary  and  economic 
policies, must not be overestimated. 
We  must therefore carry out an objective analy-
sis  of these  difficulties  before  giving  a  judg-
ment on them. It is  with  this  in  mind that this 
chapter has been drawn up.  It consists of four 
sections: general remarks, value added tax, ex-
cise duties and corporation tax. 
General remarks 
54.  The general obstacles standing is  the way 
of tax harmonization were  described in  Chap-
ter I (point 5).  These mainly involve difficulties 
of a  political and economic nature and differ-
ences in  economic and social structures and in 
the view taken of the role of taxation in general 
and individual taxes in  particular.  Point 6 out-
lined  the  reasons  which  explain  how,  despite 
these obstacles, it  has been possible to set har-
monization  in  motion.  One  of these  reasons 
should  be  restated  here:  major  conflicts  be-
tween  tax  harmonization  and  the  freedom  of 
Member States to  use taxes as  a budgetary and 
economic instrument have so far been avoided 
because,  except  in  the  case  of capital  duty, 
Community action has related only to the struc-
tures and bases of taxation.  · 
55.  The situation will of course change funda-
mentally once tax harmonization is extended to 
cover tax  rates.  Member States  will  then  find 
themselves  confronted  with  three  major prob-
lems: 
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56.  The first problem is  a purely political one. 
It is  whether Member States will agree to relin-
quish  their  autonomy  in  tax  matters  and 
whether national parliaments in  particular will 
agree to give  up a  part of one of their funda-
mental prerogatives, namely the power to freely 
vote taxes. 
It may  reasonably be assumed that such  will-
ingness to relinquish sovereignty will  be forth-
coming only if there is a strong political resolve 
to  make  headway in  the  process of European 
integration and if substantial progress is  in  fact 
made in this direction. 
57.  The  second  problem  concerns  the  room 
for manoeuvre which Member States must have 
if they are to be able to  pursue their budgetary 
and  economic  policies.  While  such  room  for 
manoeuvre  may  narrow  as  integration  pro-
gresses,  it  will  not  be  lost altogether. The fol-
lowing remarks may be made in this respect; 
(i)  the closer alignment of VAT and excise duty 
rates, which  is  necessary if tax frontiers  are to 
be  abolished,  need  not  necessarily  result  in 
complete standardization. As  has already been 
pointed  out,  differences  may  remain,  so  that 
some degree of flexibility could be retained un-
der the harmonized system; 
(ii)  large areas of taxation, such as personal in-
come tax, are directly covered by the harmoni-
zation  process to only a  small  extent if at all, 
and  these  will  remain  essentially  within  the 
sphere  of  national  sovereignty;  however,  the 
strucutre of total receipts from taxes and social 
contributions would be affected by the converg-
ence of tax systems; 
(iii)  as pointed out in  the  part of this  chapter 
dealing with corporation tax, harmonization of 
the  latter tax  will  not  prevent  Member States 
from  using it as an economic policy instrument. 
58.  The third  problem  concerns the repercus-
sions of harmonization on the structure of total 
receipts from  taxes and social contributions. It 
is impossible to state at present what the ranges 
for VAT and excise duty rates will have to be. It 
may be assumed, however, that the ranges will 
be  formed  around  the  average  for  national 
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degree  of balance  as  possible  in  the  efforts 
which  the  various  Member States  will  have  to 
undertake. 
At  all  events,  if the  volume of tax  receipts  in 
each  country  is  to  remain  the  s~me, Member 
States will  have to  make compensatory adjust-
ments elsewhere (particularly in the area of per-
sonal income tax), which means modifying the 
structure of their total  receipts from  taxes  and 
social contributions. This is likely to give rise to 
numerous  difficulties,  notably  political  objec-
tions,  possible  changes  in  the  pattern of con-
sumption and thus in production and trade, sig-
nificant effects on the cost of living, a need to 
change the method of financing social security, 
etc. 
As  already  stated  at  the  end  of Chapter I II, 
sudden upheavals in  the structure of total  tax 
receipts  could  well  prove  intolerable;  it  will 
therefore not be possible to overcome these dif-
ficulties unless a prudent harmonization policy, 
aimed  at  achieving  very  gradual  progress,  is 
pursued. 
Value added tax 
59.  Harmonization of national  VAT rate sys-
tems is one of the basic preconditions for elimi-
nating tax frontiers  within  the Community. At 
the same time, such harmonization is one of the 
most difficult problems to resolve in the Com-
munity tax harmonization process. 
Harmonization  of  VAT  rates  involves  three 
questions whose solutions may have far-reach-
ing repercussions for each Member State: 
(i)  standardization of the number of rates, 
(ii)  standardization  of the  lists  of goods  and 
services subject to the different rates, 
(iii)  closer alignment of the levels of the rates. 
Standardization of  the number of  rates 
60.  The number of VAT rates applied in each 
country has been selected in response to several 
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requirements, the most important of which  are 
those  linked  to  social  considerations (e.g.  dif-
ferential taxation of 'basic' and 'luxury' items), 
economic considerations (e.g.  the development 
of certain industries) and budgetary considera-
tions. 
A  single  rate  system  is  preferable  in  terms  of 
taxation practice and neutrality, but from  a so-
cial  point of view a multiple rate system gener-
ally  has  the  advantage,  in  raising  the . same 
amount of tax revenues, of being less regressive 
in  relation  to  income.  This  is  why,  in  most 
Member States,  intense  pressure  is  exerted  in 
favour of having several rates. In practice, how-
ever,  the impact of a  multi-rate  system  on  in-
come redistribution depends both on the cover-
age of the different rates and on the structure of 
household consumption. It is, for instance, pos-
sible for an increased rate not to have a particu-
larly progressive action if it .is  applied to goods 
which  figure  prominently  in  the  consumption 
of all  households:  at  the  other  extreme,  the 
wider the range of everyday consumer products 
covered  by  reduced  or zero  rates,  the  greater 
will be the non regressive effect of such rates. 
The  higher regressivity  of a  single rate  system 
can  in  theory  be  corrected  by  other tax  mea-
sures or by direct subsidies. This has been done 
in  Denmark  which  applies  a  single  rate  but 
which has at the same time introduced partially 
offsetting subsidies on a few  major dairy prod-
ucts.  Such an approach presents the advantage 
of greater selectivity, but requires more sophis-
ticated techniques for social  transfers,  is  likely 
to encounter political  opposition and  may in-
volve administrative costs which are considered 
unacceptable. For these reasons, there would be 
great difficulties in the way of its general adop-
tion. 
61.  This  de facto  situation and the  political, 
economic and social  considerations which  un-
derlie it make it difficult to achieve Community 
agreement on any type of solution. The heated 
discussions on the problem of zero-rating when 
the  proposal  for  the  Sixth  VAT  Directive  was 
being examined give some indication of the dif-
ficu)ty  of the  task  which  the Community will 
have to face in this respect. 
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services subject to the different rates 
62.  As  stated in Chapter IV, the lists of goods 
and services subject to the different rates at pre-
sent in  force  at national level  reveal a  number 
of  similarities.  For  example,  foodstuffs  are 
given preferential treatment in all the countries, 
either by means of reduced rates, or, as in  Den-
mark, by means of direct aids. 
There  are  none  the  less  major  differences  of 
classification as  between Member States which 
apply the same number of rates, and such dif-
ferences are not fortuitous but are the result of 
national traditions and constraints. 
63.  Any change in the coverage of the various 
national  VAT  rates  is  likel/to have repercus-
sions  in  the  budgetary,  economic  and  social 
fields. 1 
Even so, in  several cases, some Member States 
have in  the past not only made adjustments in 
the categories of goods and services coming un-
der a  particular rate, but have also made large-
scale changes involving either the abolition of 
rates or the introduction of new rates. In France 
and  Belgium,  for  example,  the  'intermediate' 
rates have been abolished; in the United King-
dom, on the other hand, a 'higher' rate was in-
troduced, but was subsequently abolished while 
the standard rate  was  increased by  seven  per-
centage points. In addition, changes in  classifi-
cation  have  sometimes  been  made  for  short-
·term economic policy reasons and have, in such 
cases, been temporary in character. 
Harmonization  would,  of course,  make  such 
changes impossible and might therefore be re-
garded as a major political and economic con-
straint.  This  impression  would hardly be tem-
pered by the fact that it would still be possible 
in  future to carry out changes of classification, 
since such changes would  only be  possible  at 
Community level subject to a Council decision 
and would no longer be the responsibility of in-
dividU;al governments. 
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Closer alignment of  the levels of  rates 
64.  Whatever the number of rates which might 
be  adopted  in  the  context  of harmonization, 
and even if it is accepted that total standardiza-
tion of these rates is not essential in eliminating 
tax frontiers and that some differences could be 
tolerated, closer alignment of rates  is  likely to 
alter the  financial  equilibria of those  Member 
States whose  rates  differ appreciably from  the 
average level opted for at Community level. 
The  adjustments  in  the  structure  of total  re-
ceipts  from  taxes  and  social  contributions 
which these countries will  have to make in  or-
der to  offset any  decrease  or increase  in  their 
VAT revenue are likely to have a significant ef-
fect on practically all the economic aggregates: 
consumer  price  levels,  compensation  of  em-
ployees, the volume of consumption, of invest-
ment, of the output of firms and of exports, the 
balance of payments and the distribution of in-
comes. 
65.  Furthermore, since one of the features  of 
the  Community is  the  high  degree  of interde-
pendence of Member States' economies, the ef-
fects  of harmonizing  rates  and  of the  conse-
quent  offsetting  measures  taken  at  national 
level will not normally be confined to the econ-
omies  of individual  Member  States,  but  may 
also make themselves felt in the other Member 
States.  · 
66.  In each Member State, the scale of there-
percussions of closer alignment of rates will  of 
course depend on the extent to which rates will 
have  to  be  altered;  however,  in  specific  na-
tional  situations,  adjustments  in  the  level  of 
value-added taxation  which  are  in  themselves 
of little  significance  could  produce  'perverse' 
social and economic effects. In a period of high 
inflation, for example, a slight increase in VAT 
rates  may  produce  a  disproportionately  large 
increase in consumer prices, while a decrease in 
the  VAT  burden  may  in  some  cases  not  be 
passed on in full to the final consumer. 
1  1t  should he  noted that on  17  May  1979  the Finance Com-
millee of the German Bundestag requested the Federal Gov-
ernment to push for Community harmonization of the cover-
age of VAT rates. 
53 67.  Analysis of the budgetary, economic and 
social repercussions which  might arise in  each 
Member State  from  closer  alignment of VAT 
rates  must  be  based  on  detailed  studies,  and 
these are at present either not available or not 
up to date. Moreover, such studies cannot have 
any real  value  until  such time  as  realistic  hy-
potheses (on the level, number and coverage of 
the rates) have been formulated by the. Commu-
nity institutions. This presupposes detailed dis-
cussions  beforehand  at Community level  and 
the emergence of some degree of political con-
sensus. 
In addition, to be complete, such studies would 
have  to  include  examination  of possible  ar-
rangements to offset in whole or in part the ef-
fects  of closer alignment of VAT rates, i.e.  the 
studies would have to cover measures relating 
to other taxes, measures relating to social secur-
ity and measures in other fields, and this would 
extend the problem beyond the bounds of taxa-
tion. 
68.  Until  such  time  as  studies  along  these 
lines become available, ail that can be done is 
to make a very rough assessment of the extent 
to which closer alignment of VAT rates would 
directly affect the budgets of the various Mem-
ber States. 
If it  is  assumed,  purely by  way  of illustration 
and without making any value judgment, that: 
(a)  two rates would be applied in each country: 
a  reduced  rate  for  foodstuffs  (the  products 
listed  in  the  first  21  chapters of the  Common 
Customs Tariff) and a  standard rate for  other 
products and for all services; 
(b)  each  Member State would  have  to  set the 
level of the two national rates within the limits 
of two  'ranges', i.e.  15% to  17% for the stan-
dard rate and 3 % to 5 % for the reduced rate; 
and if account is taken of the present situation 
regarding  VAT  rates  and the  very  incomplete 
data at present available, the following may be 
expected to happen: 
(a)  Belgium,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands 
and the  Federal  Republic of Germany would 
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probably be  able to keep the budgetary effects 
of the operation to a minimum; 
(b)  Denmark and France would see a  very sig-
nificant  drop  in  VAT  receipts,  with  the  fall 
amounting to some 20% in  the  case of Den-
mark and some 10% in the case of France; 
(c)  Luxembourg  and  the  United  Kingdom 
would see a  substantial increase  in  their VAT 
receipts, amounting to some 20 o/o  in the case of 
Luxembourg and some 30 % in the case of the 
United Kingdom. 
These estimates are  of a  strictly budgetary na-
ture and have nothing to do with assessing the 
increases or decreases in  receipts from  an eco-
nomic or social point of view. 
Before  drawing  conclusions  from  these  esti-
mates,  it  should  not  be forgotten  that,  in  this 
area,  any  forecast  (even  if fairly  detailed  and 
carefully  worked  out)  based  on  the  situation 
obtaining  at  a  given  moment runs  the risk  of 
being  partially or totally invalidated by  actual 
developments in  the  various  national econom-
ies  and,  above  all,  by  changes  made  in  tax 
structures.  Tax  structures  can  in  fact  change 
radically, even from one month to the next, as a 
result of decisions taken by  Member States ex-
ercising their full  sovereignty, since there are at 
present  no  Community  rules  limiting  sover-
eignty in this area. 
For  example,  no estimate  carried  out in  1978 
could have  foreseen  that in  1979  the  standard 
rate of VAT in  the  United Kingdom would be 
increased  from  8 %  to  15 %  and  that,  conse-
quently,  one of the  major obstacles  to  closer 
alignment of VAT rates (the extremely low level 
of the  VAT  burden  in  the  United  Kingdom 
compared with the other Member States) would 
be sharply reduced. 
69.  The  extent  to  which  closer  alignment  of 
VAT rates would affect the overall  tax  burden 
might,  on  the  basis  of the  assumptions  and 
rough estimates outlined above, be minimal in 
the case of some Member States, but more ap-
preciable in the case of others, with an increase 
of about 0.5-1  % in total receipts from taxes and 
social contributions in  the case of the  Federal 
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the case of the United Kingdom, but decreases 
of about 2-3  o/o  in the case of Luxembourg and 
an increase of 3-4 o/o  in the case of France and 
about 3-4 o/o  in the case of Denmark. 
In  the  case  of these  last  two  countries,  this 
would  represent  a  shortfall  in  tax  revenue 
which could be offset only with some difficulty, 
since  the  receipts  lost in  the  VAT  area  would 
have to be recouped elsewhere. 
However,  Member States already have experi-
ence of very  considerable changes in  their tax 
structures.  For  example,  in  the  Federal  Re-
public of Germany, the relative share of VAT 
receipts  fell  in  1973  by  1.5  percentage points, 
while the share of income taxes rose by 2.5  per-
centage points; in  France, the proportion of re-
ceipts  from  taxes on  consumption fell  in  1974 
by 3.4 percentage points, while the share of di-
rect  taxes  increased  by  2.4  percentage  points; 
the same shift occurred in  Italy in  1975  (VAT 
receipts down 3 percentage points and receipts 
from  direct  taxes  up  2 percentage  points);  in 
the Netherlands, the proportion of total receipts 
from  taxes  and social  contributions accounted 
for by taxes on consumption fell  in  1974 by  1.9 
percentage  points,  while  the  share  of  social 
contributions  increased  by  1.7  percentage 
points;  in  Denmark,  receipts  from  indirect 
taxes  fell  in  1971  by  6.5  percentage  points 
(with VAT alone accounting for 2.6  percentage 
points in this decrease), but this was more than 
offset by the increase in direct taxes (up 6.8 per-
centage points). 
70.  In  conclusion,  the  following  points  may 
be made: 
(i)  closer  alignment  of VAT  rates  may  have 
large-scale  repercussions  for  those  Member 
States  whose  present  rates  differ  most  from 
whatever Community range is adopted ;1 
(ii)  the differences between rates are for the mo-
ment  tending  to  narrow  rather  to  widen, 
but  this  is  probably  mere  coincidence  and 
there  are  no  grounds  for  assuming  that  this 
trend will  continue if no Community action is 
taken; 
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(iii)  the inevitable budgetary, economic and so-
cial  repercussions  of harmonizing rates  could 
be mitigated somewhat if, as would indeed ap-
pear essential,  the  operation  were  carried  out 
gradually over time; 
(iv)  the  changes  in  national  tax  structures  re-
sulting from Community harmonization would 
not be much larger in scale than those resulting 
from  adjustments already carried out by  Mem-
ber States  with  regard  to  the  number,  or  the 
coverage, or the level of VAT rates. 
71.  Closer  alignment  of  VAT  rates  will  of 
course have one other repercussion: it will  very 
severely  restrict  the  Member  States'  capacity 
to manipulate these  rates  for  short-term  econ-
omic policy purposes. 
In this context, it  has already been pointed out 
in Chapter IV that: 
(i)  such manipulation does not represent a par-
ticularly flexible instrument; 
(ii)  probably  for  this  reason,  Member  States 
have  only very  rarely  made use  of this  instru-
ment during recent years; 
(iii)  VAT  is  a  not  very  effective  instrument, 
since  the  objectives  pursued  in  using  it  for 
short-term  economic policy  purposes have  not 
always  been achieved, or have  only been  par-
tially achieved. 
Consequently, the  problem of freedom  to use 
VAT rates for short-term economic policy pur-
poses should not be regarded as an obstacle to 
their closer alignment. 
Excise duties 
72.  The  harmonization of excises  has in  gen-
eral been examined in  the context of the  e~hofi­
tion  of fiscal  frontiers.  The  Commission  has 
proposed  that,  by  the  time  that  objective  is 
1  The le\cl of national rates may of course change considera-
bly hetwecn now and such time as the rates are brought more 
do~ely inlo line. 
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cises- on wine, beer, alcohol, tobacco and mi-
neral  oils  - should  be  harmonized;  that  the 
rates of these excises should either be  harmon-
ized  or brought  relatively  close  together;  that 
other taxes  giving  rise  to  frontier  controls,  to 
charges on imports and to rebates on exports-
most of which are of minor budgetary import-
ance  - should  be  abolished;  and  that  other 
taxes  not  directly  affecting  trade  across  fron-
tiers  (e.g.  taxes  on  entertainments) may be re-
tained under national control. 
73.  In  fact,  contained  within  this  latter cate-
gory are a number of taxes which have, or may 
have, considerable impact upon particular eco-
nomic sectors. In particular, there are the taxes 
levied  in  most  Member  States  on  insurance 
premiums. It is  of course possible to envisage 
limited adaptations of such taxes to make them 
consistent with the abolition of fiscal  frontiers. 
However  the continued non-harmonization of 
such  tax~s is  clearly  inconsistent  with  the  full 
establishment of a  common  market  for  insur-
ance. Similarly, in  the field  of capital transac-
tions, the differing tax treatment of share trans-
fers  gives rise to distortions which, as freedom 
of capital movements increases, will have to  be 
tackled. (The Commission recalls its  1975  pro-
posal for a partial harmonization of such taxes, 
which the Council has yet to examine, even at 
the technical level.) It might likewise be argued 
that the existence of widely differing systems of 
registration  taxes  for  passenger  J;ars  in  the 
Community could form  an obstacle to  the full 
establishment  of a  common  market  for  such 
cars. 
74.  However, the excises remain the major is-
sue to be resolved in  abolishing fiscal  frontiers, 
and it  is  here  that the  major consequences of 
harmonization arise for the Member States. 
The most important of these consequences are: 
(i)  conflicts  between  the  harmonized  excise 
structure and accepted social priorities; 
(ii)  possible changes  in  consumption patterns, 
to the detriment of domestic producers; 
(iii)  changes in tax revenues; 
56 
(iv)  loss  of flexibility  in  short-term  economic 
policy. 
Conflicts with social  priorities 
75.  The  Commission  recognizes  the  political 
sensitivity of introducing taxes on goods tradi-
tionally tax-free (e.g. table wine in Italy and the 
Federal  Republic of Germany) or of abolishing 
taxes  on  goods traditionally taxed (e.g.  coffee 
in  the  Federal  Republic of Germany, sugar in 
Belgium).  Reaction to such changes may often 
be  further  exacerbated,  if  compensating 
changes have to be made in other taxes in order 
to maintain revenue. 
There is no easy or quick solution to such prob-
lems.  Commission  proposals  have  sought  to 
bring  such  changes  about  over  a  relatively 
lengthy  timescale,  so  that  the  likely  effects 
could  be  fully  discussed  in  advance  and  ab-
sorbed  in  a  gradual  manner. The Commission 
approach has been to invite the Member States 
to agree at Community level on the excise sys-
tem which objectively fits their joint needs, and 
to  fix  deadlines  for  its  implementation.  Na-
tional adaptation could then proceed at a speed 
and in  a  manner best suited to  individual cir-
cumstances.  However,  such  an  approach  is 
manifestly  unworkable,  so  long  as  individual 
Member  States  regard  their  existing  social 
priorities as  given, and incapable - even over 
time - of change. 
Changes in consumption patterns 
76.  The potential effects of tax changes on con-
sumption patterns are selfevident. The situation 
in relation to the harmonization of excises is  in 
some  respects  similar  to  that  which  arose  in 
abolishing  intra-Community  customs  duties 
and in  creating the common external tariff.  In 
theory,  of course,  removal  of protective  cus-
toms duties is a dissimilar process from the har-
monization of excises, which are- supposedly 
- neutral  between  domestic  production  and 
imports. 
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structured as  to have a  more or less  protective 
effect.  Some features  are  blatantly discrimina-
tory and have been attacked accordingly by the 
Commission  under  Article 169.  In  addition,  a 
high  excise  rate,  a  particular  excise  structure, 
and other,  non-fiscal  factors,  may  often  com-
bine to achieve effects which, if not demonstra-
bly protective, certainly make access to certain 
markets unattractive or difficult. 
77.  Basically,  this  problem  arises  from  what 
may  be  described  as  a  symbiotic  relationship 
between  national  industries  and  national  ex-
cises.  Under the considerable pressure of high 
tax incidence, and usually over a  lengthy  per-
iod,  each  has  adapted  to  the  other.  Conse-
quently, many producers of excise goods have 
become  either  wholly  dependent  on  their 
domestic  market (and its  unique excise  struc-
ture) or have at least become dependent on a 
stable and relatively profitable domestic base as 
the foundation of their total market. 
Of course  this  is  by  no  means  invariably  the 
case:  there are many producers within the ex-
cise industries who are heavily export-oriented. 
Nevertheless, preoccupation with protection of 
the domestic base is a widespread phenomenon 
amongst excise producers. A broad advance in 
harmonizing  the  excises  will  require  that  the 
majority, rather than the minority as at present, 
begin  to regard the Community as  a  whole as 
their domestic market. 
Changes in tax revenues 
78.  Budgetary  constraints  are  perhaps  the 
most frequently cited constraints on excise har-
monization. The budgetary problem  may arise 
in one of three ways. First, there is the effect of 
abolishing existing excises (the case of coffee in 
the  Federal  Republic of Germany) or of intro-
ducing a new one (the case of table wine in  the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy).  In the 
great majority of cases, such changes in the tax 
base  are  of  marginal  budgetary  importance. 
Moreover, as the examples of coffee and table 
wine  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
show, they  may  prove to be self-cancelling in 
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revenue terms.  Finally, given a reasonable per-
iod  of  adaptation,  there  is  no  reason  why 
changes in the tax base should reduce the over-
all taxable capacity of a given economy. It may 
therefore be concluded that the problems which 
arise  from  such  changes,  although  frequently 
presented as budgetary problems, are in reality 
problems  of category  (i)  referred  to  above -
that  is,. conflicts  between  the  harmonization 
process and national social priorities. 
79.  Secondly, harmonization of the structures 
of individual  excise  may give  rise  to changed 
tax receipts. For example, the proposed exemp-
tion from the alcohol excise for alcohol used in 
perfumes and the like could give rise to reduced 
tax receipts in a number of the Member States. 
Here  again,  the  budgetary  effects  of  such 
changes are in most cases marginal, even negli-
gible.  And the Commission has  proposed that 
harmonization of tax structures should precede 
harmonization  of tax  rates,  precisely  in  order 
that  changes  in  tax  revenues  arising  from 
changes  in  coverage  or  in  exemptions  from 
each excise  can,  if necessary,  be corrected  by 
changes  in  the  basic  rate  of the  excise  con-
cerned. In fact, as in the preceding point, these 
supposed budgetary  problems  prove  on closer 
examination to relate, not to tax receipts, but to 
long-established social priorities. 
80.  Thirdly,  and  most  importantly,  there  are 
the potential effects on revenue of harmonizing 
or at least of approximating the rates of the five 
excises  to  be  retained  in  the  harmonized  sys-
tem. This process could present sizeable budg-
etary problems; it could influence, as discussed 
in Chapter I II, the overall balance between di-
rect and indirect taxation in individual Member 
States.  However, the overall  problem is  not as 
considerable  as  may  be  suggested.  Given  the 
differing  degree  of  reliance  of  the  Member . 
States on revenue from  VAT and from  the ex-
cises, both overall and individually, the budget-
ary effects of harmonizing the rates of each ex-
cise  could be to  some extent selfcancelling, or 
could in  part be compensated by the effects of 
harmonizing VAT rates. 
81.  The  problems  presented  in  harmonizing 
the rates of each of the five  major excises vary 
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garettes  account  for  about  90%  of the  total 
yield,  and tax  rates  already  fall  within  a  rela-
tively  narrow  range,  the  highest  rate  being 
roughly  one and a  half times  the  lowest.  The 
yield  of  the  mineral  oils  excise  arises  over-
whelmingly (up to 95 %) from road fuels. Abso-
lute variations in the rates on petrol (a range of 
roughly one to two) and diesel  oil  (a range of 
roughly one to eight) are greater than for cigar-
ettes. 
Nevertheless, the rates of each of these excises 
are likely to be subject in the future to two fac-
tors  which  should  encourage  convergence  of 
the basic rates. First, the production costs of cig-
arettes are  already  very  similar in  most of the 
Member States. This trend is  likely to continue 
with  increasing  concentration.  In  the  case  of 
road fuels,  production costs are also very simi-
lar  throughout  the Community and  this  trend 
will  be  reinforced  by  the  continuing  rise  in 
crude oil  prices relative to transport and refin-
ing  costs.  Secondly,  notwithstanding  the  ab-
sence of common policies  in  relation  to  these 
products,  the  generally  accepted  health  risks 
from cigarettes and the need to conserve oil im-
pose similar constraints on the policy of all the 
Member States in  taxing each of them. For any 
Member States to pursue a policy of actively re-
ducing  the  incidence  of excises  on  cigarettes 
now seems excluded. For road fuels,  the situa-
tion is  more complex. The effects of conserva-
tion policies seem likely to be towards a move-
ment in excise, over time, in the same direction. 
However, the situation of the United Kingdom, 
which  at  present  benefits  from  large  revenues 
from  oil  production, is  radically different from 
that of the other Member States. 
As  regards the rates on alcoholic drinks, the dif-
ferences between rates can be very large indeed. 
For  example,  in  absolute  terms,  the  highest 
basic alcohol rate (in  Denmark) is  almost forty 
times the lowest rate (in  Italy).  In some Mem-
ber States, a  heavy tax burden on all  alcoholic 
drinks  is  long-established.  In  these  countries, 
there is a long-standing preoccupation and per-
haps a growing concern over alcoholism. These 
attitudes  are  renected  in  a  trend  towards  in-
creasing excise  rates.  In  other Member States, 
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however, attitudes are  less  clear-cut.  The con-
nict between the implications for health of high 
alcohol  consumption  and the  implications  for 
producers  of  reducing  consumption  is  fre-
quently  resolved  in  favour  of relatively  low 
rates.  But  even  in  these  countries,  it  seems 
likely  that  the  long-term  trend  must  be  up-
wards. 
Con  junctura! flexibility 
82.  All  the Member States make use of selec-
tive changes in tax rates as a means of conjunc-
tural  management of demand. The  use of the 
excises for these purposes is  common in  some 
Member States,  relatively rare in  others.  How-
ever,  there  seems  to  have  been  an  increased 
awareness  in  recent years  of the damaging ef-
fects  on  the  excise  industries  of  sudden  or 
over-frequent changes in excise rates. This fac-
tor, together with an increased emphasis on mon-
etary  and  incomes  policies  seems,  to  have re-
sulted in  a  reduced reliance on changes in  ex-
cise rates for purposes of demand management. 
Nevertheless, no Minister of Finance can wel-
come a reduction in the variety of fiscal  instru-
ments at his disposal. The harmonization of ex-
cise rates, pa_rticularly  if carried out in  parallel 
with the harmonization of VAT rates, must con-
siderably  reduce  the  scope  for  manoeuvre  in 
fiscal policies. 
83.  That said, it is important to distinguish be-
tween the effects of the process of harmonizing 
the  rates  and  the  effects  once  harmonization 
has been completed. During the harmonization 
process, the constraints on Member States will 
be  largely  in  terms  of the  direction  of rates 
changes.  For example,  assuming that a  Com-
munity level had been selected (but not yet ap-
plied)  for  the  excise  on  beer,  Member  States 
would remain free to change their existing rate, 
provided the change was in the direction of the 
Community level. For most Member States and 
for most of their excises, during the movement 
towards  harmonized  rates,  their  freedom  to 
manipulate excise rates  would be reduced, but 
by  no means removed.  Even  at the final  stage 
of abolition  of fiscal  frontiers,  it  is  probably 
s.  1/80 that  some  margin  between  individual  excise 
rates will be tolerable. Such a margin could well 
be used by Member States from time to time for 
demand management purposes. Nor should the 
possibility be excluded of Member States tem-
porarily exceeding the permitted level for a par-
ticular excise, on condition of course that trade 
was  unimpeded. Even at the final  stage, there-
fore,  the 'excise option' will  not disappear en-
tirely from the range of fiscal instruments avail-
able to national Finance Ministers. 
84.  In  order to  place  in  a  wider  perspective 
the possible consequences of harmonization for 
tax revenues and for demand management, cer-
tain  general  conclusions  which  can  be  drawn 
from Table 5 in  Chapter IV should be set down 
here. They are as follows: 
(a) All  the  Member States  have allowed some 
or all  of their excise rates to fall  relative to the 
general price level. This suggests that, during a 
period of sustained inflation, the excise base in 
the  Member States is  likely to be  more or. less 
eroded by a failure of governments to secure in-
creases  in  the  specific  excise  rates  at  least  in 
line with inflation. 
(b)  In  no  Member State is  the approach to in-
creases in excise rates consistent, whether to in-
creases  overall  in  relation to the  general  price 
level, to  increases in  particular excises in  rela-
tion to declared social, health and conservation 
policies, or in relation to increases in  the rates 
levied on competing products. 
(c)  In  the  absence  of Community  policies  to 
govern  the  evolution  of excise  rates,  whether 
absolutely or relatively, and on the assumption 
of continuing inflation in  the medium term, the 
divergencies  between  rates  now  apparent  are 
likely to subsist and may well  increase  in  cer-
tain cases. 
85.  There  are  some  obvious  inferences  to  be 
drawn.  The  first  is  that,  although  free  from 
Community constraints, Member States  find it 
difficult  to  pursue  in  consistent  fashion  even 
the most basic objective of the excises - that 
is, the raising of government revenue. 
Secondly,  governments  should  devote  a  sus-
tained effort to explaining to the public the ef-
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feet of inflation in reducing the incidence of the 
excises.  In  the field of direct taxes, the pheno-
menon of fiscal  drag  has become well-known, 
to such a point that more or less regular correc-
tions to income tax allowances, to take account 
of inflation,  are  regarded  as  the  norm  rather 
than the exception amongst the Member States. 
By contrast, fiscal boost- the declining incid-
ence of excises  with  inflation - is  much  less 
widely  understood.  In  their  own  interests, 
Member States should take steps to correct this 
situation. 
Thirdly, the inconsistencies in excise policies in 
all  Member States  suggest an  inability  on  the 
part of national governments to  maintain a co-
herent  excise  system  in  the  face  of individual 
pressure groups. Moreover, with each added in-
consistency,  the  greater  the  inequities  of the 
system and the greater the difficulty in resisting 
demands for  further  changes.  In  such a  situa-
tion,  every  excise  industry has an incentive to 
apply  the  maximum  pressure  for  tax  conces-
sions in  its  favour.  Equally, no excise industry 
can plan for future with any reasonable degree 
of certainty. 
86.  It  seems  not  unreasonable  to  conclude 
that the result of national control over the ex-
cises  is  a  significant  degree  of inconsistency 
and inequity, both as regards structure and the 
evolution  of tax  rates.  Against  such  a  back-
ground,  suggestions  that  a  Community excise 
system would impose constraints on the Mem-
ber  States  seems  an  argument  in  favour  of, 
rather than against, such a  measure. Moreover, 
it  would be  naive to  suppose that Community 
policies  for  sectors  which  are  subject  to  sub-
stantial  excise  burdens  such  as  energy,  trans-
port,  alcohol,  wine  - can  be  created  or  sus-
tained in the absence of common policies in re-
lation to the excises themselves. 
In  any  case,  as  earlier  paragraphs  show,  the 
constraints on budgetary policy and on demand 
management  would  probably  be  considerably 
less  severe  than  is  often  suggested.  Finally, 
once  structures  have  been  harmonized,  the 
system  of  harmonized  rates  could  be  imple-
mented over a relatively long period, and even 
at  the  final  stage,  some  margin  of flexibility 
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be the  creation  of a  fixed  framework,  within 
which  both  governments and industries  could 
work and plan for  the future.  It seems at least 
possible  that  the  certainty  offered  by  such  a 
framework  would considerably outweigh  such 
budgetary  and  conjunctural  constraints  as  it 
might impose. 
Corporation tax 
87.  Harmonization of the systems of corpora-
tion tax means introducing: a common scope of 
application;  a  common  tax  system;  similar 
rates of tax; a common basis of assessment. 
It also means a common solution to  the  prob-
lem  of taxing  profits  earned  abroad  through 
permanent establishments and subsidiaries. 
Scope of  application 
88.  It is important to establish who is liable to 
corporation tax.  At  present, the situation is  as 
follows: 
(i)  sole  proprietorships are never liable to cor-
poration tax; 
(ii)  all limited companies are subject to the tax; 
(iii)  in  the  case  of partnerships,  the situation 
varies  from  one  Member State  to  another:  in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, 
they  are  never  liable  to  corporation  tax;  in 
France  they  are  not  normally  subject  to  cor-
poration tax but may opt for  taxation, and in 
Belgium they are subject to the tax but, in cer-
tain cases, may apply not to be: 
For competition purposes, it would be desirable 
for the Member States to adopt a common posi-
tion on this matter, but any attempt to resolve 
the  problem  by  way  of harmonization  would 
probably be  doomed to  failure:  for  one thing, 
there can be no question of seeking to harmon-
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ize  personal  income taxes,  to  which  sole  pro-
prietorships are liable; for another, partnerships 
pose complex legal  problems of definition and 
form, both of which vary widely between Mem-
ber States. 
It may therefore be argued that it would be bet-
ter  to  retain  the  fundamental  principles  cur-
rently adhered to  by  the Member States, but at 
the same time make it  possible for partnerships 
(and perhaps sole proprietorships) to opt for in-
clusion in the scope of corporation tax. A solu-
tion  of this  kind  would  not require any major 
recasting of national legislation and, as a result, 
would have only limited repercussions. 
Harmonization of  systems and closer 
alignment of  rates 
89.  As stated in the previous chapter, the 1975 
proposal for  a Directive provides for the intro-
duction in all  Member States of a common par-
tial imputation system, a single rate of corpora-
tion tax in the 45-55 % bracket and a tax credit 
of between 45% and 55 %of the amount of cor-
poration tax. 
The analysis  made  in  the  previous chapter of 
the different bodies of national legislation gov-
erning company taxation reveals  that substan-
tial  differences  still  exist  between  Member 
States as regards systems of company taxation, 
tax rates and, in countries applying an imputa-
tion system, the rates of the tax credit. It is  evi-
dent, therefore, that introduction of the partial 
imputation system  in  the manner provided for 
in the proposal would have sharply differing re-
percussions from one Member State to another. 
90.  In  the  Member States  (Belgium,  France, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom) which apply 
a  partial  imputation  system  together  with  tax 
rates and tax credits falling within the brackets 
proposed by  the Commission, or very  close to 
them, the repercussions would be fairly  minor 
since the changes needed in national legislation 
would be mainly technical. 
In  contrast,  the changes  required  in  the  other · 
Member States  would  have much wider reper-
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the tax system or adjustments - in many cases 
major adjustments- in tax rates or in the rates 
of the tax credit. 
91.  A radical change would have to be  made 
to the tax system in  the two Member States that 
currently  apply  the  'classical'  system,  that  is 
to  say,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands.  In 
Luxembourg,  the  rate  of tax  (currently  40 %) 
would also have to be substantially increased to 
bring  it  within  the  bracket set.  In  the  Nether-
lands it  would  not  be  strictly  necessary to in-
crease the rate of tax (now at 48 %) in order to 
comply with  the  proposal, but the rate  would 
have to be increased if the fall  in budgetary re-
venue  resulting  from  introduction  of  a  tax 
credit had to be made good through the corpor-
ations tax system. 
92.  The  rate  of corporation  tax  has  already 
been raised in  Denmark (the rate is  now 40 %)1 
and  would  also  have  to  be  raised  in  Italy 
(where the combined impact of corporation tax 
and local company taxes [ILOR] works out at 
36.25 %).  In the  Federal  Republic of Germany, 
the  present two-rate system  (56 o/o  for  undistri-
buted profits  and 36% for  distributed  profits) 
would have to be abandoned. 
93.  The tax  credit would also  have to be ad-
justed.  In  Denmark,  for  instance,  the  rate 
(equal to around 25% of the tax) would have to 
be increased, while it would have to be reduced 
in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
where  it  is  equal to 58.6% and  100% respec-
tively  of the  aggregate  amount of tax  charged 
on distributed profits. 
94.  The  Member  States  concerned  may  well 
have serious  reservations  about increasing the 
rate of corporation tax on the grounds that, in 
the. present  economic  situation,  such  a  move 
might  aggravate the  already  precarious  finan-
cial position of a good many companies. 
The Member States that would have to  reduce 
their tax credit can also be expected to have ser-
ious reservations, since some investors might as 
a  consequence shun  the  share market, thereby 
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making  it  more  difficult  for  companies  to 
launch new issues as a way of raising capital. 
This danger may, however, be mitigated if com-
pensation  is  offered to companies, say,  in  the 
form of an adjustment in  corporation tax rates 
or in any other taxes levied on their profits. 
95.  Thought would  also  have  to be given  to 
the budgetary repercussions of the adjustments 
the Member States would have to make. 
Generally  speaking,  corporation  tax  plays  a 
rather  modest  budgetary  role  compared  with 
the other main types of tax.2 Consequently. the 
adjustments  necessitated  by  harmonization 
would presumably have  only a  limited  impact 
on tax  receipts, all  the more so  in  that,  where 
most  Member States  are  concerned, these  ad-
justments, i.e. a  higher rate of tax  and a higher 
tax  credit,  would  have  opposite budgetary  ef-
fects: in other words, they should tend to cancel 
each other out, at least in part. 
No  exact  evaluation  can  be  given,  however, 
since  a  quantitative  analysis  of the  budgetary 
effect is beset with the difficulties of attempting 
to assess  the impact of certain  factors  that are 
not  easily  quantifiable.  Among  these  factors 
should be mentioned: 
(i)  the  impact of the  introduction  of a  partial 
imputation system or a change in the tax rates 
and/or tax  credit  rates  on the  ratio  of distri-
buted  profits  (dividends)  to  non-distributed 
profits (reserves); 
(ii)  the  international  dispersal  of shareholders 
in  a  company  distributing  dividends.  As  the 
number  of shareholders  who  reside  in  other 
Member States or in non-member countries and 
who  are,  under  tax  conventions,  eligible  for 
tax  credit  increases,  the  budgetary  repercus-
sions become more marked, since the tax credit 
is  an  item  of  taxable  income  in  the  share-
holder's country of residence, while cost to the 
1  The  rate of 37% in  force  at  31  December  1979  (point44) 
was raised to 40% in  1980. 
2  In  Luxembourg. however.  it  accounted for  13.41% of total 
tax receipts and actual social contributions in  1977. 
61 budget of the tax credit is,  as  a rule, borne by 
the country in  which the company distributing 
dividends is established;  · 
(iii)  the  amount  of  dividends  distributed  to 
shareholders  who  are  not  eligible  for  the  tax 
credit  because  either  they  do  not  declare  the 
dividends, or they are resident in  non-member 
countries not applying a tax credit or they are 
parent ·companies  which  do  not  redistribute 
dividends. 
96.  There could also be consequences affect-
ing the  use  of corporation tax rates to  imple-
ment  certain  policies  (short-term  economic, 
structural,  regional,  etc.).  Although  in  recent 
years  Member States have only very  occasion-
ally used corporation tax rates for this purpose 
and  have  hardly  ever  adjusted  the  rate  for 
budgetary reasons, the  1975  proposal for a  Di-
rective allows for this  eventuality.  Under Arti-
cle 3, Member States may: 
(i)  apply  a  rate  outside  the  bracket  or  even 
complete exemption, either permanently or for 
a  limited  period  in  particular  cases  and  for 
well-defined  reasons  of economic, regional  or 
social  policy  (having  followed  a  consultation 
procedure); 
(ii)  increase or reduce corporation tax tempor-
arily for the purpose of regulating the economy. 
These provisions can, therefore, be reasonably 
expected to satisfy requirements in a balanced 
way,  i.e.  to guarantee neutrality on the capital 
market and with regard to competition by keep-
ing rates  within  a  narrow band; and to create 
the conditions necessary for implementing poli-
cies  which  require  some flexibility  of rates  in 
certain cases. 
97.  The  above  observations  regarding  the 
rates  of corporation  tax  or tax  credits  do,  of 
course, take on an additional dimension if we 
consider the longer-term hypothesis of an even 
closer alignment of rates.  · 
Common basis of  assessmentt 
98.  Since  no  harmonization  measure  has  yet 
been  proposed in  this  field,  discussion  of the 
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implications of such  measures  in  the  Member 
States would be premature and purely specula-
tive. 
On  this  matter,  we  should look  closely  at the 
particular role played by incentives.  Incentives 
are a vital element of some of the policies pur-
sued by the Member States and their alignment 
would  certainly  further  the  integration  of the 
common market as soon as  their policy objec-
tives can be defined at Community level.  How-
ever,  it  must  be  emphasized  this  would  only 
concern  incentives  in  the context of a  macro-
economic policy. Where variations in the basis 
of assessment are  considered  from  the  micro-
economic angle, for example, from  a  regional 
or sectoral  viewpoint,  this  gives  rise  to  prob-
lems  of compatibility  with  other  Community 
policies such as that pursued in  relation to state 
aids. 
For the time being, therefore, harmonization of 
national  legislation relating to  the  basis of as-
sessment will  have to be confined to tax meas-
ures  proper that are  designed to safeguard the 
stability or potential of companies and, gener-
ally  speaking,  are  regarded  as  'normal' meas-
ures.  This  is,  none  the  less,  a  daunting  task, 
since the basis of assessment covers a vast field 
and  national  legislation  differs  markedly  in 
many respects  between  the  Member States.  It 
will probably take many years to complete such 
harmonization. 
99.  Another specific problem that will  have to 
be considered is  the possible adjustment of tax-
able  profits  to  take  account of inflation.  This 
problem, which assumes importance at times of 
fairly  rapid inflation, is  difficult to  resolve on 
several counts: 
(i)  opinions differ as  to  the very  principle in-
volved; one school of thought holds that allow-
ance should be  made for inflation in  determin-
ing taxable  profits,  whereas  another takes  the 
opposing view; 
'  It is  worth  noting that. generally speaking. the rules on the 
hasis of assessment are the same in all Member States, regard· 
less of a company's status. 
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made  for  inflation,  then  it  must  be  decided 
whether the taxable profits should be adjusted 
constantly or periodically (at varying intervals); 
(iii)  once the method has been chosen, the dif-
ferent technical possibilities must be examined 
and  finally  common  arrangements  must  be 
agreed upon. 
Problems arising from the taxation of  profits 
earned abroad 
I  00.  At  present,  the  Member States  fall  into 
two  groups  when  it  comes  to  taxing  profits 
earned  abroad  through  permanent  establish-
ments or subsidiaries:  None of the six  founder 
Member States  of the Community charges tax 
on profits earned through permanent establish-
ments or subsidiaries located in  another foun-
der Member State. They  apply what is  known 
as  the  exemption  method.  The  three  other 
Member  States,  however,  tax  profits  earned 
through  such  permanent  establishments  and 
profits  distributed  by  foreign  subsidiaries  to 
their  national  parent  company,  but  allow  the 
amount of foreign tax (up to the amount of cor-
responding national  tax)  to  be  deducted from 
natio·nal tax by  applying what is  known as  the 
imputation method. 
The  two  methods  do  not  always  produce  the 
same  results.  With  the  imputation  system,  for 
instance,  if  a  lower  rate  of  tax  is  charged 
abroad, the resulting benefit does not, as a rule, 
accrue to the company, but to the Treasury. On 
the  other hand, the  imputation  system  allows 
systematic account to be taken of losses made 
abroad  through  permanent  establishments, 
while this is  not normally possible with the ex-
emption method. 
In the proppsals for Directives concerning com-
pany mergers and the treatment of parent com-
panies and  subsidiaries,  the  Commission  has, 
for  reasons  to  do  with  competition,  already 
come out in  favour of the exemption method, 
on  the  grounds  that  the  level  of taxation  of 
companies carrying on their activity on the ter-
ritory of a particular Member State must not be 
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a  function  of either their country of origin  or 
the source of their capital. In its  proposal for a 
Regulation  on the Statute for  European Com-
panies, the  Commission  has  also  made provi-
sion  for  a  system  which,  using  the exemption 
method,  takes  account of losses  made abroad 
through  establishments  or  subsidiaries.  This 
system  could be extended to  all  types of com-
pany. 
In the short term, the two methods could proba-
bly be allowed to exist side by side. In the long-
er term, one or the other will have to be chosen. 
When  this  happens,  some  Member  States 
will  have to abandon a  fundamental  principle 
of their tax law, and this will create difficulties. 
63 Chapter VI 
Conclusions 
101.  In  the  foregoing  chapters,  the Commis-
sion  has  indicated the main tax  measures  that 
are  needed in  the  next  few  years if a  genuine 
common market is to be established and a great-
er  degree  of  integration  achieved  and  has 
. identified,  through  an analysis  of the taxation 
structure in  the Member States, the main diffi-
culties to be overcome if these measures are to 
be successful. 
102.  To conclude this report, the Commission 
would like to reiterate its  conviction that, with 
the prospect before us  of closer integration, all 
efforts must be directed to the ultimate achieve-
ment of two fundamental objectives, namely: 
{a) in the field of indirect taxation, the elimina-
tion of tax frontiers, that is to say, the abolition 
in  respect of trade between  Member States of 
the taxation of imports, the remission of tax on 
exports and frontier checks, with a view to con-
structing  a  genuine  single  market  within  the 
Community; 
(b)  in  the  field  of direct  taxation,  the  closer 
alignment of company tax  burdens  to  ensure 
that companies in different Member States can 
enjoy  conditions of fair  competition and that 
capital  movements  are  not  prompted  by  tax 
considerations. 
103.  The  abolition  of  tax  frontiers  entails 
fairly  close alignment of VAT and excise duty 
rates.  If company tax  burdens are  to be more 
closely  aligned,  harmonization  of corporation 
tax should, in essence, focus on the rates of tax 
and the basis of assessment. With regard to the 
basis of assessment, which  covers a  vast field, 
the  first  requirement  will  be to  draw  up  'nor-
mal' permanent measures. 'Incentives' aimed at 
promoting  investment  can  be  disregarded  in 
this  context: their use  will  have  to be coordi-
nated as  part of Community economic policy, 
but this  will  be  a  longer-term  objective.  Such 
moves towards harmonization will  not preclude 
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the tackling of other problems such as whether 
the  wealth  tax  on enterprises should be made 
general  throughout  the  Community  or  abol-
ished in the countries where it now applies.  · 
I  04.  The measures advocated by the Commis-
sion  can  be brought to fruition  only if certain. 
preconditions are met: 
(a)  in the VAT field, harmonization of the basis 
of assessment,  already  partially achieved  with 
the adoption of the Sixth  Directive, must first 
be completed. To this end, the Council must act 
on the Commission proposals before it and the 
Commission  must  put  forward  further  pro-
posals aimed at rescinding a number of deroga-
tions from  the  principle of a  uniform  basis of 
assessment.  A  decision  will  then  have  to  be 
taken  as  to whether the common VAT system 
should have one rate  or several.1  In  the latter 
case, a list of the goods and services chargeable 
at  the various rates  will  have  to  be  drawn  up. 
Lastly,  a  financial  compensation  mechanism 
will  have  to  be devised  under which  VAT re-
ceipts are  allocated to  the  country of destina-
tion; 
(b)  in  the  field  of excise  duties,  the  Council 
must firstly adopt the Commission's proposals 
concerning  the  four  excise  duties  other than 
that on tobacco to  be retained and harmonized 
(those on beer,  spirits,  wine  and  mineral  oils) 
and any other duties must be abolished or pro-
hibited,  except  those  not  entailing  frontier 
checks,  such  as  entertainments or betting tax. 
In  addition, present moves  towards  harmoniz-
ing  the structure of excise duties on manufac-
tured  tobacco  must  be  completed.  Solutions 
must also be found to the problem of financial 
compensation  between  Member  States  where 
excise duties are levied in the country of origin 
and to the problem of cooperation between tax 
administrations where  excise duties  are  levied 
in the country of consumption; 
(c)  in the field of company taxation, it is  essen-
tial  that the  Council  adopt the  I  975  proposal 
for a Directive concerning the harmonization of 
systems of company taxation and of withhold-
ing taxes on dividends. 
(') At  the moment. the number of rates ranges from one in 
Denmark to eight in Italy. 
s.  11go I  05.  The  analysis  of  the  taxation  structure 
made  in  Chapter  III  shows  that  there  are 
marked and, in some cases, very substantial dif-
ferences in the extremes of the overall tax bur-
den,  the structure  of total  receipts  from  taxes 
and  social  contributions,  and  the  relative 
weight  of the various taxes,  and that these re-
mained  virtually  unchanged  during  the  refer-
ence  period  1973-77.  There  has'  not,  therefore, 
been  any  spontaneous  movement  towards 
alignment of Member States' tax systems. 
106.  The general difficulties to be resolved-
political, economic, social and budgetary- are 
· spelt out in  Chapter II  (point 5)  and in  Chap-
ter V (points 54 to 58). The difficulties posed by 
the individual taxes concerned are analysed in 
Chapter Y. To these manifold and daunting ob-
stacles must be added the problems inherent in 
the further  enlargement of the  Community to 
take in three new Member States. 
, 
I  07.  Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the 
measures advocated are surely within our reach, 
provided:  · 
(a)  there  emerges  a  strong  political  resolve  to 
make substantial  headway in  the  construction 
of Europe: without it, the numerous constraints 
imposed by tax harmonization will not be toler-
ated by the Member States; 
(b)  that harmonization is  a very gradual, stage-
by-stage  process  avoiding  sudden  upheavals 
with  unacceptable repercussions for  the  Mem-
ber States. If the changes needed are to be ac-
ceptable, it is  also essential that progress in the 
construction of Europe and progress in tax har-
monization are kept broadly in step.  ' 
I  08.  The  development  of common  policies, 
together with  its  corollary, namely an expand-
ing  Community  Budget,  may  help  to  smooth 
the path towards tax harmonization if the Com-
munity employs the instrument of taxation for 
economic or budgetary policy purposes. 
109.  Experience has shown that any change in 
the tax structures of a Member State is a matter 
of controversy, but also that where justified at 
national level, reforms - even far-reaching re-
forms  - can  be  carried  out  expeditiously.  A 
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further lesson that experience has taught is that 
the Community interest is generally disregarded 
when national tax policies are being framed. 
The failure to  take account of the Community 
interest is an obstacle to tax harmonization and 
indeed may accentuate the divergences between 
tax  systems.  In  the  Commission's  view,' this 
situation  must be remedied.  If there is  to be a 
maximum  degree· of convergence  between  tax 
systems, the Community interest must serve as 
a benchmark for any adjustments to them. 
The Commission accordingly considers that the 
idea  must  be  revived  of some  form  of prior 
consultation  1  on  the  most  important measures 
planned by the national authorities in the fields 
covered by tax harmonization. A prior consul-
tation  procedure of this kind would enable all 
the  bodies  involved  in  the  national  decision-
making process to take into account the Com-
munity dimension of tax problems. 
II 0.  Lastly, the Commission feels that the time 
is  not ripe for  setting a schedule for the meas-
ures  to  be  taken.  The  magnitude  of the  task 
and the  present uncertainty as  to how  fast  the 
Community  can  progress  towards  economic 
and monetary union rule out the  possibility of 
fixing any definite deadlines. The Commission 
simply hopes that th~ present difficulties facing 
Europe will  be resolved in  a Community spirit 
so that a welcome new impetus can be given to 
the building of Europe. 
( 1)  This idea was  mooted in the 1975  Action Programme for 
Taxation:  Bull.  EC  7/8-1975,  points  1401  to  1404;  Bull.  EC 
9-1975. Part Three. 
65 Annexes ~.  Table 13- Federal Republic of  Germany 
1973  1974 
Taxes and social contributions 
I  I 
a  b  a  b 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and withholding taxes)  27.72  IQ.43  29.00  10.96 
Corporation tax  3.51  1.32  3.14  1.19 
Wealth taxes (including estate 
duties)  2.81  1.06  2.70  1.02 
Total  34.04  12.81  34.84  13.17 
VAT  14.41  5.42  13.91  5.26 
Excise duty on beer  0.37  0.14  0.34  0.13 
Excise duty on wine  0.09  0.04  0.09  0.03 
Excise duty on spirits  0.92  0.35  0.88  0.33 
Excise duty on tobacco  2.57  0.97  2.40  0.91 
Excise duty on mineral oils  4.80  1.81  4.30  1.63 
Total of these excise duties  8.75  3.29  8.01  3.03 
Other taxes  9.84 
'  3.70  9.51  3.60 
Total of national taxes  67.04  25.23  66.27  25.06 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities  0.91  0.34  1.04  0.39 
Total tax receipts  67.95  25.57  67.31  25.45 
Actual social contributions  32.05  12.06  32.69  12.36 
General total  100.00  37.63  100.00  37.81 
!/' 
--------
"'  00 
0 
a -share of the various taxes or coniributions in total receipts rrom taxes and social contributions 
b =share of the various taxes or contributions in GDP (at market prices) 
1975  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
27.44  10.2~  27.70  10.67  28.29  11.26 
2.82  1.05  3.36  1.30  4.13  1.64 
2.80  1.04  2.97  1.14  2.95  1.18 
33.06  12.32  34.03  13.11  35.37  14.08 
14.07  5.24  13.48  5.19  13.13  5.23 
0.33  0.12  0.30  0.12  0.27  0.11 
0.09  0.03  0.10  0.04  0.09  0.04 
0.81  0.30  0.78  0.30  0.79  0.31 
2.31  0.86  2.16  0.83  2.05  0.82 
4.46  1.66  4.18  1.61  4.02  1,60 
8.00  2.98  7.52  2.90  7.22  . 2.88 
9.06  3.38  9.13  3.51  9.08  3.61 
64.19  23.92  64.16  24.71  64.80  25.80 
1.14  0.42  1.14  0.44  1.13  0.45 
65.33  24.34  65.30  25.15  65.93  26.25 
34.67  12.92  34.70  13.37  34.07  13.50 
100.00  37.26  100.00  38.52  100.00  39.81 





1973  1974 
Taxes and social contributions 
I 
a  b  a 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and withholding taxes)  27.20  10.41  29.29. 
Corporation tax  I  8.00  3.05  7.67 
Wealth taxes (including estate 
duties)  0.81  0.30  0.68 
Total  36.01  13.76  37.64 
VAT  17.60  6.71  17.99 
Excise duty on beer  0.40  0.15  0.46  ,. 
Excise duty on wine  0.20  0.06  0.13 
Excise duty on spirits  0.50  0.19  0.47 
Excise duty on tobacco  1.55  0.58  1.32 
Excise duty on mineral oils  4.80  1.81  3.73 
Total of these excise duties  7.45  2.79  6.11 
Other taxes  6.08  2.32  5.68 
Total of national taxes  '  67.10  25.58  67.42 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities  1.35  0.51  1.37 
Total tax receipts  68.75  26.09  68.79 
Actual social contributions  31.55  12.04  31.21 
General total  100.00  38.13  100.00 
- ---
a -share of the various taxes or contributions in total reoeipts from.taxes and social contributions 




















1975  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
31.74  13.39  31.46  13.32  33.05  14.56 
7.19  3.03  6.56  2.77  6.15  2.70 
0.69  0.26  0.71  0.30  0.80  0.34 
39.62  16.68  38.74  16.39  40.00  17.60 
15.56  6.56  17.11  7.24  16.54  7.29 
0.38  0.15  0.36  0.14  0.30  0.13 
0.12  0.05  0.19  0.08  0.19  0.08 
0.48  0.19  0.48  0.20  0.46  0.20 
1.38  0.58  1.42  0.59  1.43  0.62 
3.94  1.66  3.64  1.53  3.33  1.46 
6.30  2.63  6.09  2.54  5.71  2.49 
5.24  2.20  5.21  2.20  5.15  2.26 
66.72  28.07  67.15  28.37  67.40  29.64 
1.43  0.60  1.19  0.50  1.92  0.84 
68.15  28.67  68.34  28.87  69.32  30.48 
31.85  14.44  31.66  13.41  30.68  13.56 
100.00  43.11  100.00  42.28  100.00  44.04  . 





1973  1974 
Taxes and social contributions 
I 
a  b  a 
Personal income taxes 
(including local taxes and 
withholding taxes)  52.39  22.25  56.74 
Corporation tax  3.12  1.32  3.21 
Wealth taxes 
(including estate duties)  5.48  2.33  5.30 
Total  60.99  25.9()  65.24 
VAT  17.86  7.58  17.o7 
Excise duty on beer  1.73  0.74  1.71 
Excise duty on wine  0.32  0.14  0.33 
Excise duty on spirits  1.13  0.48  1.07 
Excise duty on tobacco  3.54  1.50  3.16 
Excise duty on mineral oils  2.34  0.99  1.97 
Total of these excise duties  9.06  3.85  8.24 
Other taxes  9.78  4.15  7.76 
Total of national taxes  97.69  41.48  98.31 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities  0.37  0.16  0.43 
Total tax receipts  98.06  41.64  98.74 
Actual social contributions  1.94  0.82  1.26 
General total  100.00  42.46  100.00 
~-- ---- _:....__  -
a -share of the various taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions. 





















~·,  1975  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  r 
b  a  I 
b 
54.14  22.16  52.58  22.19  50.72  21.60 
3.16  1.29  3.81  1.61  3.08  1.31 
5.65  2.31  4.84  2.04  5.04  2.15 
62.95  25.76  61.23  25.84  58.84  25.06 
17.13  7.01  17.57  7.42  18.95  8.07 
1.84  0.15  1.65  0.70  1.59  0.68 
0.41  0.17  0.43  0.18  0.45  0.19 
1.24  0.51  1.23  0.52  1.26  0.54 
3.36  1.38  3.21  1.35  3.29  1.40 
2.13  0.87  2.11  0.89  2.54  1.08 
8.98  3.68  8.63  3.64  9.13  3.89 
9.04  3.70  10.57  4.46  11.02  4.70 
98.10  40.15  98.00  41.36  97.94  41:72 
0.56  0.23  0.72  0.30  0.82  0.35 
98.66  40.38  98.72  41.66  98.76  42.07 
1.34.  0.55  1.28  0.54  1.24  0.53 
100.00  40.93  100.00  42.20  100.00  42.60 
-----··- - -
-~  ~  ·~-~  Table 16- France 
"  00 
0 
Taxes and social contributions 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and withholding taxes) 
Corporation tax 




Excise duty on beer 
Excise duty on wine 
Excise duty on spirits 
Excise duty on tobacco 
Excise duty on mineral oils 
Total of these excise duties 
Other taxes 
Total of national taxes 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities 
Total tax receipts 























b  a 
3.43  11.35 
2.04  7.66 
0.20  0.62 
5.67  19.63 
8.56  24.65 
0.02  0.06 
0.04  0.09 
0.31  0.86 
0.55  1.29 
1.59  4.07 
2.51  6.37 
5.21  10.01 
21.99  60.66 
0.25  0.68 
22.22  61.34 
13.39  38.66 
35.61  100.00 
a =share of the various taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions 






















1975  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
10.76  4.02  11.41  4.49  12.15  4.79 
4.90  1.83  5.55  2.17  5.40  2.14 
0.74  0.27  0.48  0.18  0.43  0.18 
16.40  6.12  17.44  6.84  17.98  7.11 
23.05  8.62  23.49  8.70  21.17  8.32 
0.06  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.04  0,01 
0.09  0.03  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.02 
0.85  0.31  0.79  0.31  0.78  0.31 
1.11  0.41  1.00  0.39  0.75  0.29 
3.73  1.47  3.26  1.28  3.78  1.50 
5.84  2.24  5.15  2.01  5.41  2.13 
13.21  4.94  13.07  5.15  12.78  5.03 
58.50  21.92  59.15  22.70  57.34  22.58 
0.62  0.23  0.65  0.25  0.74  0.29 
60.12  22.15  59.80  22.95  58.08  22.87 
40.88  18.23  40.20  15.84  41.92  16.47 
100.00  39.38  100.00  38.79  100.00  39.34 





1973  1974 
Taxes and social contributions 
I 
a  b  a 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and withholding taxes)  25.78  8.27  26.12 
Corporation tax  2.65  0.85  2.60 
Wealth taxes (including estate 
duties)  10.23  3.28  9.93 
Total  38.66  12.40  38.65 
VAT  15.94  5.11  15.82 
Excise duty on beer  5.57  1.79  5.16 
Excise duty on wine  0.30  0.09  0.26 
Excise duty on spirits  4.64  1.49  4.46 
Excise duty on tobacco  7.64  2.45  6.95 
E·xcise duty on mineral oils  6.62  2.12  6.19 
Total of these excise duties  24.77  7.94  23.02 
Other taxes  9.07  2.91  8.56 
Total of national taxes  88.44  28.36  86.05 
Various levies accruing to 
the Eunpean-t:ommunities  0.71  0.23  0.80 
Total tax receipts  89.15  28.59  86.85 
Actual social contributions  10.85  3.48  13.15 
General total  100.00  32.07  100.00 
- - - ----- ----
a """share of the various taxes or contributions. in total receipts from-taxes and social contributions 




















1975  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
27.22  9.07  27.82  10.25  27.63  9.72 
2.18  0.73  1.78  0.66  4.11  1.44 
8.55  2.85  7.74  2.85  6.70  2.36 
37.95  12.65  37.34  13.76  38.44  13.52 
14.39  4.79  15.31  5.64  . 16.99  5.98 
5.42  1.80  5.50  2.03  5.14  1.81 
0.30  0.10  0.31  0.11  0.29  0.10 
3.95  1.32  3.74  1.38  3.60  1.27 
6.61  2.20  5.89  2.17  4.67  1.64 
7.41  2.47  7.68  2.83  7.50  2.64 
23.69  7.89  23.12  8.52  21.20  7.46 
6.70  2.23  6.60  2.44  6.49  2.28 
82.73  27.56  82.37  30.36  83.12  29.24 
2.26  0.75  3.27  1.20  3.95  1.39 
84.99  28.31  85.64  31.56  87.07  30.63 
15.01  5.00  14.36  5.30  12.93  4.55 
100.00  33.31  100.00  36.86  100.00  35.18 




Taxes and social contributions 
'· 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and with-
holding taxes) 
Corporation tax 




Excise duty on beer 
Excise duty on wine 
Excise duty on spirits 
Excise duty on tobacco 
Excise duty on mineral oils 
Total of these excise duties 
Other taxes 
Total of national taxes 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities 
Total tax receipts 




















1973  '  1974 
I 
b  a  I 
4.61  16.31 
0.46  1.73 
0.14  0.29 
5.21  18.33 
4.67  17.10 
0.05  0.10 
- -
0.15  0.42 
0.90  2.77 
2.46  7.78 
3.56  1t:o1 
4.46  11.46 
17.90  57.96 
0.31  1.04 
18.21  59.00 
12.38  41.00 
30.59  100.00 
a -share of the various taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions 



















1975  1976  1917 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
19.14  5.99  21.30  7.11  23.39  8.02 
2.51  0.78  2.11  0.76  2.57  0.98 
0.20  0.06  0.19  0.06  0.18  0.06 
21.85  6.83  23.60  7.93  26.14  9.06 
14.19  4.44  14.58  4.96  15.30  5.35 
0.07  0.02  0.09  0.03  0.11  0.04 
- - - - - -
0.29  0.09  0.28  0.11  0.27  0.09 
2.77  0.86  2.32  0.76  2.16  0.74 
9.38  2.93  7.72  2.54  8.12  2.82-
12.51  3.91  10.48  3.44  10.66  3.69 
8.81  2.75  8.30  2.73  7.32  2.52 
57.36  17.93  56.96  19.06  59.42  20.62 
1.03  0.32  1.22  0.41  1.55  0.53 
58.39  18.25  58.18  19.47  60.97  21.15 
41.61  14.10  41.82  13.78  39.03  13.38 





1973  1974 
Taxes and social contributions 
I 
a  b  a 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and withholding taxes  22.24  7.83  21.85 
Corporation tax  11.52  4.06  15.50 
Wealth taxes (including estat~ 
duties)  1.72  0.60  1.23 
Total  35.48  12.49  38.58 
VAT  10.87  3.89  9.64 
Excise duty on beer  0.32  .  0.11  0.37 
Excise duty on wine  0.19  0.06  0.15 
Excise duty on spirits  0.72  0.25  0.63 
Excise duty on tobacco  1.92  0.67  1.51 
Excise duty on mineral oils  4.64  1.63  3.47 
Total of these excise duties  7.79  2.72  6.19 
Other taxes  16.99  5.99  16.30 
Total of national taxes  71.13  25.03  70.71 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities  0.89  0.31  0.97 
Total tax receipts  72.02  25.34  71.68 
Actual social contributions  27.98  9.87  28.32 
General total  100.00  35.21  100.00 
---- --- - ------
a -share of the various taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions 




















1975  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
22.89  10.15  21.45  10.00  22.31  11.06 
10.56  4.68  12.15  5.66  13.41  6.67 
1.05  0.46  1.14  0.53  1.23  0.60 
" 
34.50  15.29  34.74  16.19  36.95  18.33 
10.75  4.77  10.18  4.74  9.29  4.59 
0.41  0.18  0.37  0.17  0.32  0.16 
0.19  0.08  0.16  0.06  0.15  O.o7 
0.65  0.27  0.60  0.28  0.55  0.27 
2.03  0.90  2.06  0.95  2.00  0.99 
4.09  1.81  3.77  1.15  3.39  1.67 
7.37  3.24  6.96  3.21  6.41  3.16 
15.86  7.04  14.99  6.99  15.73  7.78 
68.48  30.34  66.87  31.13  68.38  33.86 
0.72  0.32  0.64  0.29  0.73  0.26 
69.20  30.66  67.51  31.42  69.11  34.12 
30.80  13.66  32.49  15.15  30.89  15.27 
100.00  44.32  100.00  46.57  100.00  49.39 
- -------~  Table 20 - Netherlands 
'  00 
0 
Taxes and social contributions 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and withholding taxes) 
Corporation tax 




Excise duty on beer 
Excise duty on wine 
Excise duty on spirits 
Excise duty on tobacco 
Excise duty on mineral oils 
Total of these excise duties 
Other taxes 
Total of national taxes 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities 
Total tax receipts 





















1973  1974 
I 
b  a  I 
11.87  26.87 
2.97  6.64 
. 0.64  1.56 
15.48  35.07 
6.63  14.04 
0.13  0.26 
0.05  0.10 
0.32  0.71 
0.62  1.32 
1.41  2.91 
2.53  5.30 
2.39  4.76 
27.03  59.17 
0.59  1.27 
27.62  60.44 
16.85  39.56 
44.47  100.00 
a =Share of the  variou~ taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions 





















1975  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
26.40  12.28  26.42  12.32  25.86  12.17 
7.60  3.53  6.86  3.20  6.65  3.13 
1.30  0.61  1.51  0.71  1.89  0.89 
35.30  16.42  34.79  16.23  34.40  16.19 
14.13  6.58  14.72  6.87  15.68  7.38 
0.24  0.11  0.23  0.10  0.21  0.10 
0.09  0.04  0.13  0.06  0.14  0,07 
0.72  0.33  0.72  0.34  0.70  0.33 
1.24  0.58  1.20  0.56  1.18  0.55 
2.80  1.30  2.59  1.21  2.50  1.18 
5.09  2.36  4.87  2.27  4.73  2.23 
4.36  2.03  4.77  2.22  4.99  2.35 
58.88  27.39  59.15  27.59  59.80  28.15 
1.63  0.76  2.04  0.95  2.04  0.96 
60.51  28.15  61.19  28.54  '61.84  29.11 
39.49  18.37  38.81  18.10  38.16  17.96 
100.00  46.52  -100.00  46.64  100.00  47.07 





1973  1974 
Taxes and social contributions 
I 
a  b  a 
Personal income taxes (including 
local taxes and withholding taxes)  29.86  10.04  30.86 
Corporation tax  7.57  2.55  9.43 
Wealth taxes (including estate 
duties)  13.78  4.63  12.89 
Total  -51.21  17.22  53.18 
VAT  6.76  2.27  8.61 
Excise duty on beer  1.61  0.54  1.42 
Excise duty on wine  0.41  0.14  0.41 
Excise duty on spirits  1.99  0.67  1.85 
Excise duty on tobacco  4.51  1.52  4.26 
Excise duty on mineral oils  6.55  2.20  5.04 
Total of these excise duties  15.07  5.07  I 1.98 
Other taxes  3.18  3.09  6.98 
Total of national taxes  82.22  27.65  81.75 
Various levies accruing to 
the European Communities  0.71  0.24  0.70 
Total tax receipts  82.93  27.89  82.45 
Actual social contributions  17.07  5.74  17.55 
General total  100.00  33.63  100.00 
-----
a -share of the various taxes or contributions in total receipts from taxes and social contributions 





















197S  1976  1977 
a  I 
b  a  I 
b  a  I 
b 
35.94  13.57  36.94  13.58  34.21  12.59 
5.83  2.20  4.58  1.69  5.58  2.05 
12.92  4.88  12.41  4.56  12.13  4.46 
54.69  20.65  53.93  19.83  51.92  19.10 
8.52  3.21  8.53  3.14  8.22  3.03 
1.59  0.60  1.72  0.63  1.69  0.62 
0.51  0.19  0.57  0.21  0.53  0.20 
1.71  0.65  1.91  0.70  1.60  0.59 
4.09  1.54  4.02  1.48  4.39  1.62 
3.81  1.44  4.21  1.55  4.49  1.65 
I 1.71  4.42  12.43  4.57  12.70  4.68 
5.42  2.05  4.09  1.50  6.47  2.38 
80.34  .  30.33  78.98  29.04  79.31  29.19 
0.88  0.33  1.22  0.45  1.29  0.47 
81.22  30.66  80.20  29.49  80.60  .  29.66 
18.78  7.09  19.80  7.28  19.40  7.14 
100.00  37.75  100.00  36.77  100.00  36.80 
---- - ,_ 
- --------- -----European Communities- Commission 
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Tax harmonization (which is necessary if the basic objectives of the Treaty are to be 
achieved) raises many difficulties and comes up against a large number of obstacles. 
This has led  the Commission to draw up a report on  the scope for convergence of 
tax systems in  the Community which has been submitted to the Council, Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee. 
The  report is  a general  discussion paper on  the role of taxation  in  the process of 
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